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INTRODUCTION
There is currently a lack of consensus in the federal courts about
whether, and to what extent, a company has a duty to update prior disclo-
sure that was initially accurate, but subsequently became materially un-
true, incomplete, or misleading due to subsequent events. Many courts
and scholars recognize this duty to update; however, they disagree about
the scope of the duty.
The duty to update is a judicially created duty. The duty serves the
public policy goal of protecting investors from inadequate disclosure.
The duty to update has evolved slowly, and its status as an independent
duty has largely depended on judicial interpretation of its relation to an-
other judge-created duty-the duty to correct. The scope of these two
duties, as defined by the various circuits, the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC" or "Commission"), and scholars, has over time con-
verged and diverged. Unfortunately, the courts, the SEC, commentators,
and litigants have failed to consistently recognize the distinction between
the duties to correct and update. For example, there are commentators
who have, in effect, collapsed the two duties into one, under the rubric of
the duty to correct.1 This is achieved via a broad definition of the duty to
correct which encroaches upon the niche reserved for the duty to update.
By contrast, the Seventh Circuit in 1995 decoupled the duties, and
explained the distinction between the duties to correct and update.2 Ac-
cording to the court, "a historical statement that, at the time made, the
company believed to be true, but as revealed by subsequently discovered
information actually was not [true]" triggers a duty to correct.3 On the
I See infra Part lIM.C.
2 See Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1331-32 (7th Cir. 1995).
See Part IV.E for an extensive discussion of this case.
3 Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1331.
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other hand, "a forward-looking statement-a projection-that because of
subsequent events becomes untrue" can activate a duty to update.4 How-
ever, this attempt to set apart the two duties, in conjunction with other
judicial and academic efforts to distinguish the duty to correct from the
duty to update, has failed to introduce consistency to the case law. The
distinction between the two duties is significant because an imposition of
a duty to update is considerably more burdensome for companies than
the imposition of only a duty to correct, for the duty to update increases
the number of statements that companies must monitor to ensure that
they remain accurate. A duty to update statements that have become
materially inaccurate or misleading, as well as the concomitant liability
for a failure to discharge this duty, can be very expensive, inconvenient,
and time consuming for companies.
In enacting the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 19955
(the "PSLRA"), Congress declined the opportunity to clarify whether the
duty to update exists and, if so, the precise scope of this duty. The
PSLRA created a safe harbor for certain forward-looking statements. As
discussed below in Part IV, Congress's silence suggests that courts may
further narrow the already limited scope of the duty to update. Congress
intended for the PSLRA's safe harbor to achieve the public policy goals
of strengthening the securities markets and protecting investors by en-
couraging companies to make forward-looking statements. These state-
ments should help investors make informed investment decisions. The
imposition of a duty to update on companies is also intended to protect
investors. It protects them from companies' materially inaccurate or.
misleading statements. The problem is that a duty to update appears to
be irreconcilable with Congress's efforts to promote forward-looking
statements because companies will not be as inclined to make these state-
ments if they are required to update them should the statements become
materially erroneous or misleading.
This Note will assess the current status of the duty to update. Part I
of this Note identifies the statutory and case law origins of the duty to
update, including the fundamental duty to disclose. The clear derivation
of the duty to update provides further justification for concluding that the
duty currently does and should exist. Part II separates the duty to update
line of cases from that of the duty to correct. Part II notes that many
courts and commentators have failed to properly distinguish the distinct
roots of the two duties. In addition, it also shows that the SEC perpetu-
ated the confusion that the case law engendered. Part In focuses on
4 Id. at 1332 (citations omitted). The Stransky court acknowledged that other jurisdic-
tions and scholars have recognized such a duty to update; however, it refused to impose this
duty on companies. Id.
5 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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Backman v. Polaroid Corp.6 ("Polaroid I"'), in which the First Circuit
explained the significant difference between the duties to correct and up-
date, and clarified the scope of each duty. This Part also reviews and
critiques the scholarly response to the decision. It concludes that the
First Circuit reached the right decision on public policy grounds. Part IV
assesses the current status of the duty to update in light of more recent
case law, commentary, and the PSLRA. It compares the various post-
Polaroid II cases in an attempt to determine whether the courts have
reached a common understanding of the duty to update and its scope.
This Part demonstrates that the status of the duty to update is rather un-
certain-even within certain circuits. Part V suggests ten ways in which
courts can restrict the application of the duty to update.7 The Note con-
cludes that the duty to update exists today-at least in certain circuits-
however, the bewildering case law in the various circuit courts since Po-
laroid II, the uncertainty surrounding the PSLRA's treatment of the duty
to update, and important public policy motivations strongly suggest that
courts are likely to narrow the scope of the duty. This narrowing of the
duty would represent a judicial preference for promoting disclosure and
protecting investors by encouraging forward-looking statements rather
than via a broad duty to update.
I. BACKGROUND
A. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Neither the Securities Act of 1933, as amended 8 ("Securities Act"),
nor the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended9 ("Exchange Act")
expressly codifies the duty to update. However, most commentators
agree that, assuming the duty exists, it originates from a broad interpreta-
tion of section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5. 10 The recog-
6 910 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc) [hereinafter Polaroid I1].
7 This Note does not discuss how courts can limit, and have limited, plaintiffs' ability to
bring, and prevail on, securities fraud claims in general. For a discussion of how federal case
law and the PSLRA have brought about this result, see Douglas M. Branson, Running the
Gauntlet: A Description of the Arduous, and Now Often Fatal, Journey for Plaintiffs in Fed-
eral Securities Law Actions, 65 U. CN. L. REv. 3 (1996). A comprehensive analysis of the
elements of a prima facie securities fraud claim and the pleading requirements for these claims
is also beyond the scope of this Note.
8 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
9 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1994 & Supp. I 1996).
10 See, e.g., A. JACOBs, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER Rut._ 10B-5 § 88.04[b], at 4-
20 (rev. 2d ed. 1991); Dennis Block et al., A Post-Polaroid Snapshot of the Duty to Correct
Disclosure, 1991 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 139, 154; Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities"
Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1366 (1966) (suggesting that "[ilt would require no great
extension of existing trends to read ... [Riule [10b-5] as providing a general sanction for an
issuer's failure to disclose where previous disclosures have become materially misleading");
Robert H. Rosenblum, An Issuer's Duty Under Rule lOb-5 to Correct and Update Materially
Misleading Statements, 40 CATH. U. L. REv. 289, 292-93, 302, 306-07 (1991); cf. Carl W.
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nition of a duty to update comports with the public policy underlying the
Exchange Act. The primary purpose of the Exchange Act is to "imple-
ment.., a 'philosophy of full disclosure."' 11 The Exchange Act man-
dates that public companies fulfill strict disclosure obligations via
periodic and current reports and proxies. 12 Congress designed these dis-
closure requirements with an eye toward protecting investors. 13 Section
10(b), the antifraud provision of the Exchange Act, and Rule 10b-5 are
intended to shield investors from fraud and misrepresentation. Section
10(b) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly
... [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
[registered] security ... any manipulative or deceptive device or contri-
vance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe."' 4 Section 10(b) provides the SEC with the authority to
promulgate Rule lOb-5 which proscribes any individual from
(a) . . .employ[ing] any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud, (b) ... mak[ing] any untrue statement of a ma-
terial fact or... omit[ting] to state a material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading, or (c) .. .engag[ing] in any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with a
purchase or sale of any security. 15
Shortly after the SEC introduced Rule lOb-5, the courts have treated
a violation of section 10(b) and the Rule as grounds for a private cause of
action.' 6 Consequently, an issuer is civilly liable under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5(b) for making an inaccurate statement regarding a material
fact.' 7 This is a basis for the duty to correct.' 8 However, the Rule does
not literally address an issuer's obligation to amend, that is, update, prior
Schneider, Duty to Update: Does a Snapshot Disclosure Require the Commencement of a
Motion Picture?, INsiGHTS, Feb. 1989, at 3 (arguing that a recognition of a duty to update
represents "a very strained reading of Rule 10b-5"). For the text of section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5, see infra text accompanying notes 14-15.
11 Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977); see also S. REP. No. 73-792,
at 1-5 (1934) (emphasizing the importance of disclosure).
12 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1 (1997) (requiring issuers to file annual reports); 240.13a-
13 (requiring issuers to file quarterly reports); 240.15d-11 (requiring issuers to file current
reports); 240.14a-2 to 240.14a-15'(stating the proxy requirements).
13 See S. REP. No. 73-792, at 1-5 (1934).
14 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
15 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. See infra Part I.C.1 for a definition and discussion of
materiality.
16 See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); Kardon
v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
17 See, e.g., Hirsch v. Du Pont, 553 F.2d 750, 761 (2d Cir. 1977).
18 See infra Part II.A.
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disclosure that was initially true, but subsequently became false or mis-
leading with the passage of time or as a result of ensuing circumstances.
Scholars have found support for such a disclosure obligation in the sec-
ond clause of Rule 10b-5(b)1 9 which prohibits the "omi[ssion]" of a "ma-
terial fact necessary" to ensure that a statement is not "misleading. 20
The language of the second clause of Rule lOb-5(b) does not alone im-
pose on a company a duty to update a prior disclosure with material
data,21 but rather paves the road for the acknowledgement of the duty.
B. DUTY TO DISCLOSE
The courts have bridged the gap between Rule lOb-5(b) and a duty
to update by developing the criteria that precipitate a duty to disclose.22
The SEC and the Supreme Court articulated these criteria in dicta in a
number of insider trading cases, and have invoked Rule 1Ob-5 to impose
a duty to disclose on corporate insiders.23 For example, the SEC held in
Cady, Roberts & Co.24 that corporate insiders have an "affirmative duty
to disclose material information... which [is] known to them by virtue
of their position but which [is] not known to persons with whom they
deal and which, if known, would affect their investment judgment. 25
The SEC identified two bases which trigger the duty to disclose material
inside information: (i) a relationship of trust that enabled the corporate
insider to learn of inside information and (ii) the "unfairness" of permit-
ting an insider, absent disclosure, to avail himself of the information
through trading.26 To the extent these circumstances existed, Cady, Rob-
erts imposed on insiders a duty to disclose material information before
they could engage in trading.27
The courts have identified other circumstances, in addition to the
two-pronged standard discussed in Cady, Roberts and its progeny, which
give rise to an issuer's duty to disclose. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co.,28 another nondisclosure and insider trading case, the Second Circuit
extended a company's duty to disclose to cover "sufficient information"
19 See, e.g., Rosenblum, supra note 10, at 292-93, 302, 306-07.
20 See supra text accompanying note 15.
21 See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980). The Supreme Court re-
viewed the legislative history and explained that neither Congress nor the SEC contemplated
whether a "failure to provide information" represented a violation of section 10(b) or Rule
lOb-5. Id.
22 See Rosenblum, supra note 10, at 292-313.
23 See id. at 293-306, 313.
24 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
25 Id. at 911.
26 Id. at 912 & n.15.
27 Id. at 912.
28 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S.
976 (1969).
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to prevent prior disclosure from becoming "false or misleading or... so
incomplete as to mislead." 29 In other words, a company's initial "act of
disclosure triggers the [Rule lOb-5] prohibition against materially mis-
leading statements. '30
Subsequent insider trading cases followed the Cady, Roberts analy-
sis, which considered a duty to disclose a prerequisite to finding liability
for a Rule lOb-5 violation, but came to some conclusions that neither the
Cady, Roberts SEC nor the Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. court would probably
have ever accepted. For example, in Chiarella v. United States,31 the
Supreme Court recognized in dicta that "silence in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities may operate as a fraud actionable under
§10(b) despite the absence of statutory language or legislative history
specifically addressing the legality of nondisclosure." 32  However,
"[w]hen an allegation of fraud is based on nondisclosure, there can be no
fraud absent a duty to speak .... [A] duty to disclose under [section]
10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market infor-
mation."33 The Court applied the two-pronged test used in Cady, Rob-
erts, but held that the petitioner did not have a duty to disclose material
information because he lacked a fiduciary or equivalent relationship with
the sellers from whom he purchased the securities. 34 The Court reiter-
ated this analysis three years later in Dirks v. SEC,35 holding a tippee not
to be liable absent a breach of duty by his tipper.36
In 1987, the First Circuit in Roeder v. Alpha Industries, Inc.37 ex-
panded upon the Cady, Roberts two-pronged approach that the Supreme
Court used in Chiarella and Dirks, and the "sufficient information" stan-
dard of Texas Gulf Sulphur.38 The First Circuit explained that under
Rule 10b-5, an issuer may have a duty to disclose material facts if any of
the following three conditions were present: (i) "insider trading"; (ii) a
"statute or regulation requiring disclosure"; or (iii) "inaccurate, incom-
plete or misleading prior disclosures. '39 This third criterion serves as a
logical antecedent to a duty to update. Roeder expanded upon the notion
developed in Texas Gulf Sulphur that when a public company com-
29 Id. at 862.
30 Gordon Jones II, Comment, In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation: The Second
Circuit Revisits Rule lOb-5-The Duties to Correct, Update, and Disclose Alternative Business
Plans, 28 GA. L. Rv. 1019, 1027-28 (1994).
31 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
32 Id. at 230.
33 Id. at 235.
34 Id. at 232.
35 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
36 Id. at 667.
37 814 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1987).
38 Id at 26.
39 Id. at 27 (citations omitted).
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mences disclosure, it assumes a duty to disclose material information in
the future that is necessary to re-establish the accuracy and completeness
of the original disclosure.40 The legislative history of section 10(b) pro-
vides further support for such a disclosure obligation.41 In 1934, the
Senate Report for the Exchange Act stated that "the omission of a mate-
rial fact constitutes a misleading statement."42 Cited in several duty to
correct and update cases43 because of its broad language,44 Roeder pro-
vided the final groundwork for the recognition of such duties.
C. MATERIALITY
1. The Standard
In Roeder, the court explained that a company only has a duty to
disclose additional information that is material. 45 The presence of one of
the three criteria would not trigger a duty to disclose nonmaterial infor-
mation.46 However, if the additional information is material, yet the
company is not under a duty of disclosure, the failure to disclose is also
not actionable under Rule lOb-5.4 7 The Second Circuit contributed to the
duty to disclose line of cases by broadly defining materiality for the pur-
poses of Rule lOb-5 in Texas Gulf Sulphur. According to the Second
Circuit, "[tihe basic test of materiality ... is whether a reasonable man
would attach importance ... in determining his choice of action in the
transaction in question. '48 The Supreme Court elaborated on this materi-
ality standard in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,49 requiring "a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have
40 The language of Roeder is thus broad enough to provide support for both a duty to
correct and a duty to update given that the third criterion does not specify whether the duty to
disclose is triggered (i) because the original disclosure was "inaccurate, incomplete or mislead-
ing" at the time of dissemination or (ii) because the original disclosure became "inaccurate,
incomplete or misleading."
41 For a more expansive discussion of how the Exchange Act's legislative history and, in
particular, that of section 10(b) is consistent with the duties to correct and update, see Rosen-
blum, supra note 10, at 308.
42 S. REP. No. 73-792, at 22 (1934).
43 See, e.g., Polaroid II, 910 F.2d 10, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc). For a separation
of the duty to correct and duty to update lines of cases, see infra Part II.
44 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
45 Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 24-26 (1st Cir. 1987).
46 See supra text accompanying note 39.
47 Roeder, 814 F.2d at 26 (explaining that "[e]ven if information is material, there is no
liability under Rule lOb-5 unless there was a duty to disclose it"); see also infra note 53
(reciting similar language from the Supreme Court's decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson).
48 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane) (emphasis
added) (citing, inter alia, RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 538(2)(a) (1934)), cert. denied sub nom.
Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
49 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
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been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered
the 'total mix' of information made available. '50
The materiality requirement thus reduces the burden of disclosure
on companies in two different ways. First, there is no duty to disclose
additional information unless it would be probatively important to a "rea-
sonable investor." Second, applying Basic Inc. v. Levinson,51 there is no
duty to disclose additional facts unless the original statement, which is
allegedly false or misleading, remains material.52 The Supreme Court
explained that "in order to prevail on a Rule lOb-5 claim, a plaintiff must
show that the statements were misleading as to a material fact. It is not
enough that a statement is false or incomplete, if the misrepresented fact
is otherwise insignificant. '5 3
2. The "Bespeaks Caution" Doctrine
According to the judge-created "bespeaks caution" doctrine, 54 al-
leged materially inaccurate or misleading statements, as well as alleged
material omissions, are not actionable in securities fraud cases if a com-
pany has provided adequate cautionary language.5 5 In In re Donald J.
50 lId at 449 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court in Basic Inc. v. Levinson maintained
that determinations regarding materiality are fact-sensitive, and courts must make them on a
case-by-case basis. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 250 (1988).
51 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
52 See Rosenblum, supra note 10, at 319-20.
53 Basic, 485 U.S. at 238 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court explained in a now
famous footnote: "Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule lob-5." Id.
at 239 n.17.
54 As discussed below in Part IV.F.1, the PSLRA in 1995 basically codified the bespeaks
caution doctrine.
55 See In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.-Taj Mahal Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 371 (3d
Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Gollomp v. Trump, 510 U.S. 1178 (1994). For a discussion
of the bespeaks caution doctrine, see generally 3B HAROLD S. BLOOmrErHA, SECuRTIS AND
FEDERAL CORORATE LAW § 8.26 (1997); THoMAs LEE HAzEN, THE LAw OF SEcuRms REG-
ULATION § 13.5A (3d ed. 1996); Royce De R. Barondes, The Bespeaks Caution Doctrine:
Revisiting the Application of Federal Securities Law to Opinions and Estimates, 19 J. CORP. L.
243 (1994); Klaus Eppler, "Bespeaking Caution" in Disclosure Documents, in 27TH ANNUAL
INsTITuTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 25 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. B-907, 1995); Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that "Bespeak Caution," 49 Bus. LAW.
481 (1994); Jennifer O'Hare, Good Faith and the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine: It's Not Just a
State of Mind, 58 U. Prrr. L. Rv. 619 (1997); Andrew M. Campbell, Annotation, "Bespeaks
Caution" Doctrine Under Federal Securities Laws, 130 A.L.R. FED. 119 (1996); Edward
Brodsky, The 'Bespeaks Caution' Doctrine, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 14, 1994, at 3; Joseph J. Fleisch-
man & Shirley L. Berger, 'Bespeaks Caution' Doctrine Gains Favor, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 7, 1994,
at 19.
The district court in Trump Casino traced the history of the bespeaks caution doctrine. In
re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.-Taj Mahal Litig., 793 F. Supp. 543, 549-50 (D.N.J.
1992), aff'd, 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Gollomp v. Trump, 510 U.S.
1178 (1994).
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Trump Casino Securities Litigation-Ta] Mahal Litigation,56 the Third
Circuit explained that "cautionary language ... negate[s] the materiality
of an alleged misrepresentation or omission. '57 To the extent that "fore-
casts, opinions or projections are accompanied by meaningful cautionary
statements, the[se] forward-looking statements will not form the basis for
a securities fraud claim if [they] did not affect the 'total mix' of informa-
tion the document provided investors. 58
Therefore, to the extent a statement bespeaks caution, the "caution-
ary language, if sufficient, renders the alleged omissions or misrepresen-
tations immaterial as a matter of law."'59 However, the bespeaks caution
doctrine is only available if the cautionary language is "sufficient" and
"meaningful. '60 As the Trump Casino court clarified, "[of] course, a
vague or blanket (boilerplate) disclaimer which merely warns the reader
that the investment has risks will ordinarily be inadequate to prevent mis-
information. To suffice, the cautionary statements must be substantive
and tailored to the specific future projections, estimates or opinions ...
which the plaintiffs allege. '61 While the Third Circuit in Trump Casino
held that the prospectus in question included sufficient cautionary lan-
guage to warrant application of the bespeaks caution doctrine to dismiss
the plaintiffs' claim regarding the Trump defendants' allegedly material
misrepresentations and omissions,62 other courts have been more reluc-
tant to invoke the doctrine. 63 The inclusion of cautionary language will
thus influence many courts' determinations on the materiality of prior
56 7 F.3d 357 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Gollomp v. Trump, 510 U.S. 1178
(1994).
57 Trump Casino, 7 F.3d at 371.
58 Id.
59 Id. However, Professor Hazen has explained that while "[tihe [bespeaks caution] doc-
trine . . . necessarily relates to materiality in the sense that it address[es] the question of
whether the misstatements are materially misleading when judged in light of the total mix of
information available to the investor," it has also "frequently been referred to in the context of
judging whether the plaintiff's reliance is reasonable." HAZEN, supra note 55, § 13.5A, at 798
(citations omitted); see also In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1414 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied sub nom. Miller v. Pezzani, 516 U.S. 868 (1995), and cert. denied sub nom.
Deloitte & Touche v. Miller, 516 U.S. 909 (1995) (clarifying that "the [bespeaks caution]
doctrine, when properly construed, merely represents the pragmatic application of two funda-
mental concepts in the law of securities fraud: materiality and reliance").
60 Trump Casino, 7 F.3d at 371.
61 Id. at 371-72.
62 Id. at 372, 377; see also Hillson Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204,
218 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that "[i]t is well recognized that statements that include such cau-
tionary language are usually 'not the stuff of which securities fraud claims are made"' (quoting
Romani v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 929 F.2d 875, 879 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Luce v.
Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1986)))). For an analysis of Hillson Partners' assessment
of the duty to update, see infra Part IV.D.
63 See, e.g., Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 167-68 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that
"[u]nder [Fifth Circuit] precedent, cautionary language is not necessarily sufficient, in and of
itself, to render predictive statements immaterial as a matter of law," and thus "is not per se
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statements; however, this inclusion may not necessarily insulate compa-
nies from liability for securities fraud.
D. SYNTHEsIs
In sum, one can see how Rule lOb-5, the duty to disclose, the mate-
riality standard based on the reasonable investor and balanced by the
bespeaks caution doctrine, and the public policy underlying section 10(b)
might provide the foundation for a duty to update. Rule lOb-5 proscribes
a company from failing to make further disclosure of material facts if
such an omission would render the original statement misleading. The
dicta in the insider trading cases outline a company's duty to disclose.
Texas Gulf Sulphur and Roeder add the obligation to disclose material
information when prior disclosure is untrue, incomplete, or misleading.64
Basic requires that both the original statement and the additional infor-
mation be material. 65 The standard of materiality established in TSC In-
dustries and Basic, predicated on a reasonable investor,66 as opposed to
an unsophisticated investor, expands the scope of information, the omis-
sion of which Rule lOb-5 proscribes. Aggregating these elements, a duty
to update appears to be within the purview of a company's affirmative
duty to disclose. The imposition of a duty to update will reduce the like-
lihood that companies will omit material facts that may undermine the
factual integrity of the original statement. Prevention of such omissions,
which may mislead investors, comports with the fundamental public pol-
icy objective of section 10(b)-the protection of investors from misrep-
resentation and fraud.67
UI. UNTANGLING THE DUTIES TO CORRECT AND UPDATE
In tracing the history of the duties to correct and to update, it is
important to note that the courts, the SEC, scholars, and litigants have
often used the verbs "correct" and "update," and therefore, the legal
phrases "duty to correct" and "duty to update," interchangeably. 68 The
problem is that the words "correct" and "update" have similar meanings
in common parlance that can overlap.
When a company corrects a prior disclosure, it, by definition, up-
dates the statement, for the act of adding information to make the origi-
nal statement accurate represents an update with respect to the original
dispositive"). For a discussion of this case's treatment of the duty to update, see infra Part
IV.C.
64 See supra text accompanying notes 28-30, 37-40.
65 See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
66 See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
67 See supra Part I.A.
68 For examples of recent cases in which the plaintiffs still plead duty to correct and
update claims improperly, see infra note 581.
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disclosure. For example, consider a company that announces that earn-
ings for the prior quarter grew by ten percent. If the company subse-
quently learns that earnings for the prior quarter only grew by six percent
and it corrects the earlier statement, this correction necessarily consti-
tutes an updating of the earlier statement because the company is using
new information to make a prior statement accurate.
However, a company can update a prior disclosure without neces-
sarily providing a correction. When a company merely supplements a
prior statement that was correct when made with additional information
relating to the prior statement that does not render the prior statement
incorrect, it thereby updates the statement without correcting it. For ex-
ample, consider a company that states on January 1 that it will issue a
press release on January 15 that will announce earnings projections for
the next quarter. The company then announces on January 8 that it is
also going to announce in the press release a declaration of a dividend.
This subsequent statement represents an update on the prior statement,
but it is not a correction because the original statement was not incorrect.
It was, at worst, incomplete.
On the other hand, a company can update a statement such that it
also involves a correction. For instance, using the prior example, if a
company announces on January 8 that it will not issue the press release
until January 22-rather than on January 15-the company is both up-
dating the earlier statement and correcting it, for it was inaccurate.
These similar, yet different, common meanings of "correct" and
"update" have led courts, the SEC, scholars, and litigants to imprecisely
use the legal phrases "duty to correct" and "duty to update," implying
that the duties are the same. This imprecision has created substantial
confusion. This Note maintains that although the common meanings of
the words "correct" and "update" can overlap, the legal duties, as the
Polaroid II court would ultimately recognize, 69 are not synonymous.
Each duty has a distinct role, and this distinction has important ramifica-
tions for both companies and investors.70
Another reason why courts, scholars, and litigants confuse the du-
ties to correct and update may be that the duties both originated out of
the securities fraud framework discussed above in Part I. Therefore, a
plaintiff bringing either a duty to correct or a duty to update claim in a
private cause of action must prove the same initial elements to establish a
Rule lOb-5 claim.71 "[A] plaintiff must prove that the defendant: [(i)]
made a misstatement or omission, [(ii)] of material fact, [(iii)] with scien-
ter, [(iv)] in connection with the purchase or sale of securities, [(v)] upon
69 See infra Part III.B.
70 See infra Part Ill.B.4, C.
71 See supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
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which the plaintiff relied, and [(vi)] that reliance proximately caused the
plaintiff's injury. '72 Similarly, because both duty to correct and duty to
update claims are "'fraud' claim[s], [a] plaintiff must satisfy the height-
ened pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)." 73
However, as Parts Imf and IV suggest below, a plaintiff bringing a duty to
correct claim will need to prove, in addition to these Rule lOb-5 require-
ments, elements that differ from those necessary to establish a duty to
update claim. This Part demonstrates that although the duties to correct
and update grew out of the same securities fraud framework, the case
history of the two duties branched off in different directions from their
common trunk.
A. DUTY TO CORRECT
The duty to correct is an obligation that devolves upon a company
to redress a statement that it thought was true when made, but subse-
quently learned was materially untrue, incomplete, or misleading.74 In
other words, the statement was, in reality, never correct. In contrast, a
duty to update is an obligation that devolves upon a company to supple-
ment a statement that has become materially untrue, incomplete, or mis-
leading as a result of the passage of time or the unfolding of subsequent
events.75 Part I demonstrated that companies most certainly have a duty
to correct inaccurate disclosure that, in actuality, was never true. The
courts and authorities have not questioned the existence of this duty to
correct.76 The language of Rule lOb-5(b) expressly requires such a cor-
rection.77 Similarly, following SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. and Roe-
der v. Alpha Industries, Inc., a correction of a material statement that was
false when disseminated, clearly falls within a company's affirmative
duty to disclose.78
72 Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1331 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing In
re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1244 (3d Cir. 1989); Schlifke v. Seafirst
Corp., 886 F.2d 935, 943 (7th Cir. 1989)).
73 In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1417 (3d Cir. 1997). See
infra Part IVJ for a discussion of this case.
74 See Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1331 (citing Polaroid 11, 910 F.2d 10, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1990)
(en bane)); Polaroid 11, 910 F.2d at 16-17; Rosenblum, supra note 10, at 289. This definition
of the duty represents only the consensus among the circuits and scholars-not a unanimous
definition. See infra Part I.C for a discussion of a flawed construction of the duty to correct.
For a discussion of the duty to correct in its early stages, see F. Philip Manns, Jr., Duty to
Correct: A Suggested Framework, 46 MD. L. REv. 1250 (1987).
75 See infra Part II.B.
76 See Polaroid If, 910 F.2d 10, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc) (opining that the duty to
correct is an "[o]bvious" duty); Block, supra note 10; Rosenblum, supra note 10, at 301 &
n.59, 302.
77 See supra text accompanying note 15.
78 See supra Part I.B-D.
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It should thus come as no surprise that some authorities consider
Texas Gulf Sulphur the catalyst of the duty to correct. These scholars
cite the language in Texas Gulf Sulphur regarding a company's "duty to
disclose 'sufficient information' so that the statement does not become
'false or misleading or... so incomplete as to mislead"' as support.79
However, the Second Circuit concededly did not provide any guidance as
to "the types of information necessary to avoid misleading public
disclosures. '80
The problem is that the language in Texas Gulf Sulphur is broad
enough to function also as the source of the duty to update. 81 In fact,
scholars' and courts' decision to cite the language quoted above from
Texas Gulf Sulphur82 in support of a duty to correct suggests that they
have confused the meanings of the two duties, because a company can
only update-not correct-a statement that has become "'false or mis-
leading or... so incomplete as to mislead.' ",83 A company would have a
duty to correct the statement if it discovered that it had never been true.84
A literal reading of Texas Gulf Sulphur's language supports the conclu-
sion that the case was, in fact, the "genesis" 85 of the duty to update-not
the duty to correct. Nevertheless, like Roeder, Texas Gulf Sulphur, with
its broad requirement of disclosure of "sufficient information," ploughed
the field for the duty to correct as well.
In citing two cases decided before Polaroid I that discuss the duty
to correct (as defined above), Dennis Block and his coauthors provide
much insight into the roots of the duty to correct line of cases. 86 In 1970,
the Second Circuit decided Butler Aviation International, Inc. v. Com-
prehensive Designers, Inc. ,87 disapproving of the defendants' "failure to
attempt to correct" a press release which it learned had always been inac-
curate. 88 Although Butler Aviation did not expressly recognize the duty
to correct, its emphasis on the original inaccuracy of the disclosure paved
the road for the modem duty to correct.
Thirteen years later in Rose v. Arkansas Valley Environment & Util-
ity Authority,89 the district court essentially defined the duty to correct
when it explained that "where the defendant, in good faith, has commu-
79 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 30, at 1028 (emphasis added) (omission in original). For a
discussion of this language, see supra text accompanying notes 30-31.
80 Jones, supra note 30, at 1028.
81 See infra Part II.B for a discussion of the duty to update.
82 See supra text accompanying note 29.
83 See supra text accompanying note 29.
84 See supra text accompanying note 74.
85 Jones, supra note 30, at 1028.
86 Block et al., supra note 10, at 158 n.114.
87 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970).
88 Id. at 843.
89 562 F. Supp. 1180 (W.D. Mo. 1983).
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nicated or disseminated information which later becomes known to him
to have been false or misleading when made .... [and] where the newly
discovered information has a direct bearing upon the information previ-
ously given, the defendant has a 'duty' to communicate the new informa-
tion."90 The court continued, "performance of the duty requires a further
affirmative act of the defendant, in correcting the information previously
conveyed, and the duty itself actually arises, and can be breached, only at
such later time following the original communication as the defendant
learns of the newly discovered information."91 "For convenience sake,"
the court "denominate[d] this sort of 'duty' as a 'duty to correct."' 92
Butler Aviation and Rose represent early examples of cases belonging to
the duty to correct line of cases.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in 1986 in Rudolph v. Arthur An-
dersen & Co.93 was consistent with Butler Aviation and Rose. The court
explained that "[w]here a defendant's failure to speak would render the
defendant's own prior speech misleading or deceptive, a duty to disclose
arises."'94 Furthermore, the court indicated its approval of "[tihe rule that
an accountant is under no duty to disclose ordinary business information,
unless it shows a previous report to have been misleading or incorrect
when issued."95 By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit discussed how other
"courts have refused to hold accountants liable for not disclosing ordi-
nary business information discovered after the completion of a report,
where the information did not indicate that the report was inaccurate as
of the date it was issued. '96 Therefore, although the court did not use
duty to correct language, Rudolph clearly recognized that the extent to
which the original disclosure was "misleading or incorrect" triggered a
duty to correct the prior disclosure. Subsequent cases have cited Ru-
dolph in support of a duty to correct.97 Unfortunately, however, the case
has also been improperly classified as a duty to update case.98
Butler Aviation, Rose, and Rudolph all focused on the status of the
original statement at the time of disclosure. These cases represented the
best articulations of the duty to correct prior to Polaroid 11.99
90 Id. at 1207.
91 Id. at 1208.
92 Id.
93 800 F.2d 1040 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987).
94 Id. at 1043 (citing First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978)).
95 Id. at 1044 (emphasis added).
96 Id.
97 See, e.g., In re Burlington Coat Factory See. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1431 (3d Cir.
1997).
98 See, e.g., Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 170 n.41 (5th Cir. 1994).
99 See infra Part IH.B.
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B. DUTY TO UPDATE
A company may also have a duty to update a forward-looking state-
ment that was originally accurate, but became materially deficient or
misleading over time or due to subsequent developments. 100 Some
courts and commentators have declined to recognize that Rule lOb-5 im-
plies such a duty. 01 As discussed earlier, the courts, the SEC, scholars,
and litigants have indiscriminately employed the verbs "correct" and
"update" as well as the legal phrases "duty to correct" and "duty to up-
date," which has created much confusion. Among those that have ac-
knowledged the duty, many have misidentified the case history of the
duty to update as that of the duty to correct. 0 2
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York heard two of the earliest cases addressing the duty to update. First,
in SEC v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp.,10 3 defendants announced in a
press release that Shattuck had reached an agreement with an oil refining
company to purchase it.1°4 Soon after this announcement, the president
of Shattuck recognized that "the acquisition which seemed so imminent
on [the day Shattuck issued its press release] had become a mere possi-
bility."'1 5 Shattuck's press release, apparently "[ ]true when made," thus
"became false and misleading shortly thereafter."'1 6 The court held that
the president of Shattuck violated the antifraud provisions under the fed-
eral securities laws when he "fail[ed] to correct the 'misleading impres-
sion left by statements already made"'107 that were "truthful" at the time
of issuance, but "became false and misleading shortly thereafter."' 08
Therefore, despite the usage of the word "correct," the Southern District,
in reality, recognized a duty to update.
Second, in the oft-cited case of Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc. 109 the
defendant company emphasized the safety, effectiveness, and appeal of
its contraceptive product in its annual reports and in a prospectus be-
100 See Polaroid II, 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (en bane); HAZEN, supra note 55,
§§ 13.5A, 13.10; Rosenblum, supra note 10, at 289.
101 See, e.g., Stransky v. Cununins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1995);
Block et al., supra note 10; Schneider, supra note 10; Carl W. Schneider, Update on the Duty
to Update: Did Polaroid Produce the Instant Movie After All?, 23 REv. SEc. & CoMMoDrrms
REG. 83 (1990).
102 See, e.g., infra notes 121, 154, 165 and accompanying text.
103 297 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
104 Id. at 474.
105 Id. at 475.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 476 (quoting Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y.
1962)).
108 Id at 475.
109 465 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980).
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tween 1970 and 1972.110 In reality, the device proved ineffective and
allegedly harmful."' Consequently, unsatisfied consumers brought
product liability class actions against the company. 112 In addition, in
1972, a report questioned the safety of the device. 113 The defendants
neither "attempt[ed] to modify or correct" its prior statements nor dis-
closed the lawsuits until 1974.114 Plaintiffs, who purchased stock in the
company in 1973, brought suit under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, al-
leging reliance on the defendants' false and misleading statements in the
annual reports and prospectus. 115
In considering these facts, the Southern District of New York in
Ross defined the scope of the duty to update and determined for how
long it survives. The court asserted, "It is now clear that there is a duty
to correct or revise a prior statement that was accurate when made but
which has become misleading due to subsequent events." 116 It continued
that "[t]his duty exists so long as the prior statements. remain 'alive,' "117
that is, "as long as traders in the market could reasonably rely on the
statement."" 8 Applying this doctrine to the facts, the court explained
that "the defendants owed a duty to plaintiffs to revise" the earlier state-
ments which "would appear to be of a nature that traders in the market
might reasonably rely on them until publicly corrected." ' 1 9 According to
the court, the defendants should have corrected the statements once they
learned of the "subsequent events which rendered those statements
misleading."' 20
After reviewing the relevant case law and commentary, it is appar-
ent that the court's flexible usage of the words "correct" and "revise" in
Ross has subsequently created much confusion. Many scholars have fo-
cused on the word "correct" and erroneously designated Ross as evidence
of a judicial recognition of a broad duty to correct. 121 Such a duty would
110 Id. at 906-07.
111 See id. at 906.
112 See id.
113 See id.
114 Id. at 906-07.
115 See id. at 907.
116 Il- at 908 (emphasis added).
117 Id. (citing A. JACOBs, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10B-5 § 88.04(B), at 4-
14 (rev. ed. 1978)).
118 l (quoting 2 A. BROMBERG, SEcuRITs_ LAW, FRAUD § 6.11(543) (1977)).
119 Id. (emphasis added).
120 Id.
121 See, e.g., HAROLD S. BLOOmENTHAL, GOING PUBLIC AND THE PUBLIC CORPORA1TION
§ 12.20 (1992); Block et al., supra note 10, at 160-63; Daniel L. Goelzer, Disclosure of Pre-
liminary Merger Negotiations-Truth or Consequences, 46 MD. L. R.v. 974,977 n.11 (1987).
Robert Rosenbium properly distinguished the duty to update from the duty to correct. Rosen-
blum, supra note 10, at 290. However, despite his assertion that the court's language "literally
recognizes a duty to update," he classified Ross as a duty to correct case because "the factual
situation in Ross involved a duty to correct." Id. & n.10, 301 n.59.
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be so sweeping in scope that it would swallow a duty to update. 12 2 These
scholars contend that the defendants' disclosures in Ross were initially
inaccurate, which would trigger a duty to correct. 12 3 In contrast, those
that have treated Ross as a duty to update case appear to emphasize the
state of the disclosure after the unfolding of subsequent events. 12 4 This
analysis would lead them correctly to conclude that despite the usage of
the word "correct," the court's literal language recognized a duty to up-
date because it discussed the duty in the context of when, an initially
accurate disclosure becomes misleading in light of subsequent develop-
ments. Further evidence that Ross is a duty to update case lies in the
word "revise." The disjunction suggests that "revise" must mean some-
thing other than correct because a broad construction of "correct" would
envelop the meaning of "revise," thereby rendering it redundant.12 5
The second problem, in addition to the court's word choice, is that it
applied duty to update language to a duty to correct fact pattern.12 6 In
Ross, the prior disclosure was inaccurate when made, which activates a
duty to correct.12 7 It is therefore understandable why a school of thought
has classified Ross as a duty to correct case. 12 8 The more appropriate
conclusion is that the court recognized a duty to update, 129 but misap-
plied it to a duty to correct fact pattern.
Confronted with the confusion that the case law introduced, the
SEC attempted to clarify the duties to correct and update in a June 1979
release. 130 In this release, the Commission introduced a safe harbor rule
that encourages issuers to make forward-looking statements in SEC fil-
ings. 13 1 The Commission sought to introduce a safe harbor rule that was
consistent with its commitment to investor protection. 132 The Securities
Act safe harbor for forward-looking statements in SEC filings is codified
122 See infra Part III.C.
123 See John E. Hayes, III, Note, Securities, Lies & Videotape: Backman v. Polaroid and
the Duty to Update, 39 U. KAN. L. Ray. 951, 954 n.23 (1991).
124 See id. at 954 & n.23; Jones, supra note 30, at 1029 nn.67-68. For subsequent cases
that have cited Ross in support of a duty to update, see infra note 129.
125 For a discussion of proper interpretation of disjunctions, see Bailey v. United States,
516 U.S. 137 (1995); Platt v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 99 U.S. 48 (1878).
126 See Rosenblum, supra note 10, at 290 n.10.
127 See supra text accompanying note 74.
128 See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
129 Many subsequent cases have cited Ross in support of a duty to update. See, e.g.,
Polaroid I1, 910 F.2d 10, 21 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Bownes, J., dissenting); In re Gulf Oil/
Cities Serv. Tender Offer Litig., 725 F. Supp. 712, 746 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Kamerman v. Stein-
berg, 123 F.R.D. 66, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); In re Warner Communications See. Litig., 618 F.
Supp. 735, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 798 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1986).
130 Safe Harbor for Projections, Exchange Act Release No. 15,944, [1979 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,117, at 81,938 (June 25, 1979) [hereinafter 1979 Safe
Harbor Release].
131 Id.
132 Id. at 81,939, 81,944.
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in Rule 175;133 while a nearly identical safe harbor is codified in Rule
3b-6 of the Exchange Act.134 Rule 175 provides that an issuer's forward-
looking statement tht meets the requirements of Rule 175(b) "shall be
deemed not to be a fraudulent statement... unless it is shown that such
statement was made or reaffirmed without a reasonable basis or was dis-
closed other than in good faith."'135 Given that Congress intended for the
safe harbor to encourage companies to make forward-looking statements,
Rule 175 and Rule 3b-6 appear inconsistent with a duty to update. The
safe harbor seems to suggest that duty to update liability under the an-
tifraud provisions should not attach to statements in SEC filings other
than statements "made or reaffirmed without a reasonable basis or...
disclosed other than in good faith."'136
In the 1979 release, the Commission summarized its view on the
duties to update and correct. The Commission explained:
With respect to forward-looking statements of material
facts made in relation to specific transactions or events
I there is an obligation to correct such statements
prior to consummation of the transaction where they be-
come false or misleading by reason of subsequent events
which render material assumptions underlying such
statements invalid. Similarly, there is a duty to correct
where it is discovered prior to consummation of a trans-
action that the underlying assumptions were false or mis-
leading from the outset. Moreover, the Commission
believes that, depending on the circumstances, there is a
duty to correct statements made in any filing, whether or
not the filing is related to a specified transaction or
event, if the statements either have become inaccurate by
virtue of subsequent events, or are later discovered to
have been false and misleading from the outset, and the
issuer knows or should know that persons are continuing
to rely on all or any material portion of the statements.
This duty will vary according to the facts and circum-
stances of individual cases.' 37
This discussion of the duties to correct and update, which the SEC did
not incorporate in the codified safe harbor, essentially restated the posi-
tion of the Southern District of New York in Ross.138 Unlike the court in
133 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1997).
134 Id. § 240.3b-6.
135 Id. § 230.175(a); see also id. § 240.3b-6(b) (codifying the Exchange Act safe harbor).
136 Id. §§ 230.175(a), 240.3b-6(b).
137 1979 Safe Harbor Release, supra note 130, at 81,943 (emphasis added).
138 See supra text accompanying notes 116-120.
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Ross, the Commission at least consistently used the term "correct"
throughout the release, even though the SEC appeared to be announcing,
inter alia, its recognition of a duty to update.
However, the SEC failed in its efforts to clarify because it substan-
tively acknowledged both the duty to correct and the duty to update, yet
effectively subsumed the latter under the former through its (i) failure to
speak literally of a "duty to update" and (ii) emphasis on a broad duty to
correct instead of an independent duty to update.139 The SEC recognized
in 1994 that critics have been complaining about the safe harbor for for-
ward-looking statements because, among other reasons, "it has created
confusion over whether and when there is a duty to correct or update
projections once they are made." 140 This confusion has discouraged
companies from making forward-looking statements 141-the exact an-
tithesis of what the SEC intended to achieve via the introduction of the
safe harbor for forward-looking statements. The safe harbor that Con-
gress subsequently created for forward-looking statements in the PSLRA
in 1995 has similarly failed to provide clarification of the duty to update
or to introduce uniformity to the case law in the federal circuits. 142
The Third Circuit initially appeared to end the confusion in 1984 in
Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc.143 Heublein, a target of a tender offer,
learned that a raider, via an asset sale, had access to capital that would
enable it to increase its position in Heublein. 144 On the same day that
Heublein became aware of this development, the price of the stock rose
during a period of high volume trading. 145 Heublein publicized a state-
ment that day that it was unaware of why trading in its stock in-
creased. 146 Shareholders brought suit, alleging that Heublein violated
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 when it (i) made this false and misleading
statement and (ii) neglected to update the announcement thereafter. 147
Concluding that Heublein genuinely did not know the precise reasons for
139 For a delineation of the safe harbor rule's shortcomings, see Stephen M. Muniz, Note,
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Protecting Corporations from Investors,
Protecting Investors from Corporations, and Promoting Market Efficiency, 31 NEw. ENG. L.
Rv. 655, 678-89 (1997). For specific discussion of how the safe harbor failed to clarify the
duties to correct and update, see id. at 687-89.
140 Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Exchange Act Release No. 34,831,
[1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,436, at 85,778, 85,787 (Oct. 13,
1994) [hereinafter 1994 Safe Harbor Release]. In the Release, the Commission summarized
criticisms of Rule 175. Id. at 85,786-88; see also infra text accompanying notes 346-48 (dis-
cussing three of these criticisms).
141 See infra text accompanying note 349.
142 See infra Part IV.F.2.
143 742 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985).
144 See id. at 753-54.
145 See id. at 754.
146 See id.
147 See id. at 755.
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the surge in trading,148 the court ruled that Heublein did not make an
untrue or misleading statement at the time of initial disclosure. 149 This
ruling suggests that the court did not think Heublein had a duty to correct
under the given facts. The court then stated in dicta that "if a corporation
voluntarily makes a public statement that is correct when issued, it has a
duty to update that statement if it becomes materially misleading in light
of subsequent events."' 50 This assertion, in conjunction with the court's
apparent rejection of the applicability of the duty to correct, seemed to
support a clear recognition of a duty to update. Courts and commenta-
tors have subsequently cited Greenfield as support for a duty to
update. 51
In spite of this seeming clarity, the Third Circuit in Greenfield once
again enshrouded the duty to update in semantic confusion. The court
did not impose a duty to update on Heublein because its statement "never
became materially misleading on the basis of subsequent events."'152
However, the court explained that since the statement did not become
"materially misleading[,] . .. no duty to correct ever arose."'1 53 As a
result of this language, some scholars have argued that Greenfield is a
duty to correct case. 154 Others have properly identified Greenfield as a
duty to update case.155 Therefore, although the Third Circuit acknowl-
edged the existence of a duty to update, this pronouncement was diluted
by the court's (i) decision not to impose the duty and (ii) unfortunate
interjection of duty to correct language.
Five years later, the Third Circuit had an opportunity in In re Phil-
lips Petroleum Securities Litigation156 to clear up the confusion it created
in Greenfield regarding the duty to update. Shareholder plaintiffs alleged
that the defendants neglected to inform shareholders promptly that the
defendant partnership had decided to change its publicized position on a
tender offer for its shares of Phillips Petroleum. 157 The partnership had
disclosed to the public on a number of occasions that it would not sell its
148 Nevertheless, "Heublein executives ... clearly knew of information that might have
accounted for the increase in trading." Id. at 759.
149 See id.
15o IL at 758 (emphasis added) (citing Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 83 F.R.D. 343, 346-
47 (E.D. Pa. 1979)).
151 See, e.g., infra note 155 and accompanying text.
152 Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 759-60. For a discussion of materiality, see supra Part I.C.
153 Greenfield, 742 F.2d at 759-60 (emphasis added).
154 See, e.g., Block et al., supra note 10, at 163-65.
155 See, e.g., In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1431 (3d Cir.
1997); Polaroid II, 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc); In re Gulf Oil/Cities Serv.
Tender Offer Litig., 725 F. Supp. 712, 746, 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Wallace v. Systems &
Computer Tech. Corp., No. CIV.A. 95-CV-6303, 1997 WL 602808, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23,
1997); Hayes, supra note 123, at 953; Jones, supra note 30, at 1029 n.68.
156 881 F.2d 1236 (3d Cir. 1989).
157 See id. at 1245.
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shares of Phillips Petroleum back to Phillips unless the offer treated all
shareholders equally.' 58 In contrast, the partnership entered an agree-
ment shortly thereafter with Phillips, the terms of which were not the
same for all shareholders.' 59 The plaintiffs thus alleged that the partner-
ship's prior disclosures had become false and misleading, and thus vio-
lated section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 60 The court held that the
partnership's announcement of its change of intent was sufficiently
prompt. 16 a However, the court in dicta explained that "[t]here can be no
doubt that a duty exists to correct prior statements, if the prior statements
were true when made but misleading if left unrevised."'162 As a result,
"notice of a change of intent [needs to] be disseminated in a timely fash-
ion." 163 Assuming that a statement that is "misleading if left unrevised"
becomes misleading as a result of subsequent events or the passage of
time, the Third Circuit, although it interestingly did not cite Greenfield,
once again recognized a duty to update. However, the Third Circuit left
the waters muddied when it again employed the term "correct."'164 Con-
sequently, courts and commentators have classified the case, like Green-
field, as both a duty to correct and duty to update case.' 65
Kirby v. Cullinet Software, Inc.,166 also decided in 1989, exempli-
fied the obfuscation that Greenfield and Phillips Petroleum engendered
regarding the duty to update. In Kirby, Cullinet Software issued several
press releases which contained optimistic projections concerning growth
and operating margins. 167 These projections proved illusory.'68 Share-
holders brought an action against Cullinet for violating section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5.169 The United States District Court for the District of Mas-
158 See id. at 1239-42, 1245.
159 See id. at 1239-41.
160 See id. at 1245.
161 See id. at 1246.
162 Id. at 1245 (emphasis added) (citing Thomas v. Duralite Co., Inc., 524 F.2d 577, 583-
84 (3d Cir. 1975)).
163 Id.
164 See supra text accompanying note 162.
165 Compare Block et al., supra note 10, at 169 (citing case in support of duty to correct)
with Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 316, 318 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing case in support
of both the duty to correct and the duty to update), and In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec.
Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1431, 1433-34 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing case in support of duty to update),
and Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 170 n.41 (5th Cir. 1994) (same), and Polaroid II, 910
F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc) (same), and Rand v. M/A-Com, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 242,
257 (D. Mass. 1992) (same); and Wallace v. Systems & Computer Tech. Corp., No. CIV.A.
95-CV-6303, 1997 WL 602808, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 1997) (same). See infra note 223
and accompanying text for a discussion of the First Circuit's treatment of Phillips Petroleum in
Polaroid H1. Rand, Rubinstein, Burlington Coat Factory, Wallace, and Weiner are discussed at
length infra Part IV.A, C, J-K.
166 721 F. Supp. 1444, 1450 (D. Mass. 1989).
167 Id. at 1447.
168 See id.
169 See id. at 1445.
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sachusetts quoted the aforementioned language from Greenfield that a
company has a duty to update disclosure that has become "materially
misleading" as a result of later events.170 The court then, as in Green-
field, recited duty to correct language. It recognized that the defendant
"had a duty to correct the projection, or in any event, had a duty not to
make statements which while not literally false would convey the mis-
leading impression that the recent promising prediction remained relia-
ble."' 71 Adding still more terminology, the court explained that the
defendants "had a duty to disclose adverse developments or revise its
recent prediction."' 7 2 The First Circuit, which decided Polaroid 11 one
year after Kirby,173 thus clarified the duty to update at its peak of
confusion.174
I. BACKMAN V. POLAROID
A. PANEL DECISION
1. Facts and Procedural History
Backman v. Polaroid Corp. 175 caused much controversy with its ex-
pansive interpretation of the duty to update. In November 1978, Polaroid
distributed its third quarter report, which discussed the company's robust
sales figures and production levels, balanced only by an acknowledge-
ment that it was incurring considerable costs in connection with Polavi-
sion, a new instant movie camera.' 76 However, the quarterly report,
which displayed Polavision on its cover, neglected to mention that, in
fact, sales of Polavision cameras were discouragingly low. 177 In fact,
Polaroid took measures to discontinue production until sales increased,
and secured assurance from its supplier that it would not disclose the
stoppage of production.' 78 Polaroid did not disclose the extent of Polavi-
170 Id. at 1450; see supra text accompanying note 1.50.
171 Kirby, 721 F. Supp. at 1454.
172 Id. at 1454-55.
173 Despite the duty to correct language and the new terminology, subsequent cases and
commentators have cited Kirby in support of a duty to update. See, e.g., Rand v. M/A-Com,
Inc., 824 F. Supp. 242, 257 (D. Mass. 1992); Rosenblum, supra note 10, at 302 n.61. But see
Block et al., supra note 10, at 165 (citing case in support of the duty to correct). For a discus-
sion of Rand, see infra text accompanying notes 269-72.
174 See infra Part IlI.B.
175 [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CC-) 94,899, at 94,937-3 (1st Cir.),
withdrawn and vacated, reh'g granted, (1st Cir.), rev'd, 910 F.2d 10 (lst Cir. 1990) (en banc)
[hereinafter Polaroid 1]. Polaroid I is an unreported decision. The First Circuit in its subse-
quent Polaroid II opinion explained that the panel opinion in Polaroid I has no precedential
value because the judgment was vacated. Polaroid II, 910 F.2d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 1990) (en
banc).
176 See Polaroid I, at 94,938,39.
177 See id. at 94,939.
178 See id.
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sion's underperformance in 1978 until a late February 1979 press re-
lease.179 In the wake of this press release, the price of Polaroid's stock
plummeted by just under twenty percent. 80
The plaintiffs, shareholders of Polaroid who purchased stock or op-
tions in the six-week period before the February 1979 release, brought a
class action securities fraud suit against the company, pleading a section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 violation.18 1 They argued that Polaroid made false
and misleading statements regarding Polavision in its quarterly report. 82
Alternatively, plaintiffs alleged that the statements in the quarterly report
became false and misleading six weeks before the disclosure in the press
release. 183 In short, plaintiffs advanced both a duty to correct and a duty
to update claim. A jury found Polaroid liable, and a different jury
awarded damages. 84 The district court refused to grant Polaroid's mo-
tions for judgment n.o.v. or a new trial.' 85 Polaroid subsequently
appealed.186
2. Majority Decision
In a two-to-one decision, a First Circuit panel found that the trial
judge had erred in instructing the jury and, therefore, remanded the case
for a new trial.187 The panel majority, however, proceeded to determine
whether Polaroid had a duty to disclose information about Polavision.
Accepting that Polaroid was unaware of precisely how low the sales
figures were for Polavision at the time it issued the quarterly report and
the broader ramifications thereof, the panel in Polaroid I found that the
statements in the quarterly report were not misleading when made.' 88
Hence, it did not consider applying a duty to correct.
The panel cited Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc. and Roeder v. Alpha
Industries, Inc. in support of its position that knowledge of "material
facts" necessary to "render prior statements not misleading" can trigger a
duty to disclose.' 89 Although Polaroid may have considered its state-
ments accurate and complete when it issued the report, the panel decided
179 See id.
180 See id.
181 See id.
182 See id. at 94,939-40; Polaroid 11, 910 F.2d 10, 15 (Ist Cir. 1990) (en bane).
183 See Polaroid L at 94,940.
184 See id.
185 See id.
186 See id.
187 See id.; Polaroid H, 910 F.2d at 12.
188 Polaroid I, at 94,943-44; Thomas J. Dougherty, Backman v. Polaroid: The First Cir-
cuit Declines to Expand the Duty of Disclosure, 34 BOSTON B.J. 8, 8 (1990).
189 Polaroid I, at 94,944 (citing Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 758 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 27 (1st
Cir. 1987); Starkman v. Marathon Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 238 (6th Cir. 1985)).
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that the company's subsequent actions, for example, the temporary ces-
sation of production and request that its supplier remain quiet, may have
rendered its original disclosure misleading and incomplete. 190 The panel
concluded that "there [was] sufficient evidence to support a jury's deter-
mination that the report's relatively brief mention of Polavision difficul-
ties became misleading in light of the subsequent information acquired
by Polaroid."'191 The majority thus was willing to impose a duty to up-
date prior disclosure that was accurate at the time of dissemination, but
became misleading as a result of later developments. 192
3. Dissent
Judge Aldrich, the author of the subsequent majority opinion in Po-
laroid I1,193 dissented, insisting that the quarterly report was neither mis-
leading nor did it become misleading. 194 Judge Aldrich contended that
"[m]isleading must mean misleading in fact, or by implication, within the
terms of the disclosure and not mere omission of other facts that might
be considered material by the market."'195 The dissent contended that the
quarterly report contained disclosure about the "negative earnings" of
Polavision, which does not trigger a duty to disclose information regard-
ing production. 196 The quarterly report remained "as accurate, and com-
plete, in what it said, and implied, as it was in November."'197 The
dissent appeared to argue that Polaroid's disclosure in the report was
complete not only because it restricted its disclosure regarding Polavi-
sion as to earnings, but also because it addressed historical facts as op-
posed to making forward-looking statements. Judge Aldrich explained,
"[h]ad there been a representation as to a better future, we would have a
different case."'198 The dissent summarized the majority's holding as
mandating that after a company has made disclosure, it has "a duty to
announce [the] specifics" of an "undisclosed degree of negative earn-
ings" as soon as it learns of them "even [if] between regular quarterly
reports."' 99 Judge Aldrich dissented because he could find no precedent
that imposed such a demanding disclosure duty.200
190 Id. at 94,943-44.
191 Id. at 94,944.
192 See id.
193 See infra Part II.B.
194 Polaroid I, at 94,957 (Aldrich, C.J., dissenting).
195 Ild. (Aldrich, C.J., dissenting).
196 Id. (Aldrich, C.J., dissenting).
197 Id. (Aldrich, C.J., dissenting).
198 Id. (Aldrich, C.J., dissenting).
199 Id. (Aldrich, C.J., dissenting).
200 See id. at 94,955 (Aldrich, C.J., dissenting).
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4. Criticism of the Decision
The legal community, which recognized the public policy implica-
tions of a broad duty to update historical statements of fact, widely criti-
cized the Polaroid I decision.20 ' Critics of Polaroid I saw the broad duty
to update as a "disincentive" or "deterrent" for voluntary disclosure.202
They agreed with Judge Aldrich that a duty to update covering historical
facts creates an untenable situation for management. 20 3 As Judge Al-
drich noted, management's hands are particularly tied in a scenario
where management seeks to disclose that a product has been unsuccess-
ful.2°4 In order to avoid sending shareholders into a panic and condemn-
ing the product to certain failure, management may wish to discuss in
general language the status of the product. 20 5 However, a "volunteered
general statement will [not] be safe" because management "will be faced
with a subsequent obligation to supply details. °206 On the other hand, if
management does not disclose anything about the product, but instead
focuses on more favorable matters, "the good news without the bad will
be misleading for incompleteness. '207 Recognizing these and other
problems with a sweeping duty to update, a host of amici curiae from
within the legal community supported Polaroid's petition for a rehearing
in the First Circuit. 20 8
B. EN BANC REHEARING
1. Holding
In a six-to-one decision, the majority in Polaroid II explained the
legal difference between the duties to correct and update and properly
applied the law to the facts. Judge Aldrich's majority opinion criticized
the panel opinion in Polaroid I as a "mixed marriage of a duty to update
and outright rejection of Roeder [v. Alpha Industries, Inc.]"'20 9 The opin-
201 See, e.g., Edward Brodsky, The Duty to Update Information, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 7, 1990,
at 3; Carl W. Schneider, The Uncertain Duty to Update-Polaroid II Brings a Welcome Limi-
tation, INsIors, Oct. 1990, at 2. In his dissent in Polaroid 1I, Judge Bownes, who wrote the
majority opinion in Polaroid I, reflected that certain language in the panel opinion "could be
interpreted as creating an overly broad duty on the part of corporations to update even accurate
statements of past historical fact." Polaroid II, 910 F.2d 10, 21 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(Bownes, J., dissenting).
202 See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 201, at 2.
203 Polaroid I, at 94,955, 94,957 (Aldrich, C.J., dissenting).
204 Id. at 94,957 (Aldrich, C.J., dissenting).
205 See id. (Aldrich, C.J., dissenting).
206 Id. (Aldrich, C.J., dissenting).
207 Id. (Aldrich, C.J., dissenting).
208 The Business Law Section of the Boston Bar Association, the Associated Industries of
Massachusetts, the New England Legal Foundation, the New England Corporate Counsel As-
sociation, and the American Corporate Counsel Association were among the amici curiae. See
Dougherty, supra note 188, at 9.
209 Polaroid I1, 910 F.2d 10, 17 (Ist Cir. 1990) (en banc).
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ion followed the court's then recent decision in Roeder, in which the
First Circuit identified three conditions the absence of which negated a
duty to disclose.210 The third, and most relevant of these conditions, was
that there could not be "inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading prior
disclosures." 211
The majority in Polaroid II, like the panel in Polaroid I, did not find
that Polaroid was speaking falsely or incompletely when it issued its
quarterly report.212 In fact, the disclosure was "precisely correct, ini-
tially. '213 In addition, "it remained precisely correct thereafter. '214 Reit-
erating the analysis from his dissent in Polaroid I, Judge Aldrich
explained that Roeder's requirement that disclosure "be 'complete and
accurate' . . . does not mean that by revealing one fact about a product,
one must reveal all others that, too, would be interesting, market-wise,
but means only such others, if any, that are needed so that what was
revealed would not be 'so incomplete as to mislead.' 215 The majority
applied this standard to the facts, and held that Polaroid's failure to dis-
close details regarding the sales of Polavision was not misleading be-
cause these details were "outside the scope of the initial disclosure, in no
way making it incorrect or misleading, originally, or later. ' 216 The First
Circuit reversed the district court's denial of judgment n.o.v. for Polaroid
and remanded the case for dismissal. 217 The court thus reached its deci-
sion without applying the duty to update.
2. Dicta
The dicta in Polaroid II, however, addressed the duties to correct
and update. Because the quarterly report was not "inaccurate, incom-
plete, or misleading" when made,218 the en banc court did not impose on
Polaroid a duty to correct. Nevertheless, the court reaffirmed that a duty
to correct certainly exists. According to the court, "[o]bviously, if a dis-
closure is in fact misleading when made, and the speaker thereafter
learns of this, there is a duty to correct it."'219
210 See supra text accompanying note 39.
211 Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 27 (1st Cir. 1987).
212 Polaroid II, 910 F.2d at 16. The court explained that "if management knew at the
time of the report that Polavision was a commercial failure, to say simply that its earnings
were negative might well be found to be a material misrepresentation by half-truth and incom-
pleteness." Id.
213 Id. at 17.
214 fla
215 Id. at 16 (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968)
(en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)).
216 Id. at 17.
217 Id. at 18.
218 See supra text accompanying note 211.
219 Polaroid I, 910 F.2d at 16-17.
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The court contrasted this duty to correct with the duty to update.
The Polaroid H opinion recognized that the duty to update was "a quite
different duty"220 from the duty to correct. In looking to the Third Cir-
cuit's opinion in Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., the en banc court de-
scribed the duty to update as a "call[ ] for disclosure if a prior disclosure
'becomes materially misleading in light of subsequent events.'- 22' The
court commented, "We may agree that, in special circumstances, a state-
ment, correct at the time, may have a forward intent and connotation
upon which parties may be expected to rely. If this is a clear meaning,
and there is a change, correction, more exactly further disclosure, may be
called for."'222 The court supported this statement with a "Cf." citation to
In re Phillips Petroleum Securities Litigation.223
3. Analysis of Dicta
This somewhat vague language in dicta has come to define the
scope of the duty to update. The court's dicta enumerates seven criteria
that together trigger a duty to update a disclosure. First, there must be
so-called "special circumstances. '224 The court's failure to elaborate on,
or provide examples of, what exactly are these "special circumstances"
represents the largest gap in the Polaroid II opinion. This element re-
quires clarification, for it may prove too discretionary. 225 Second, the
original statement must have been "correct at the time. '226 This criterion
preserves the already recognized distinction between the duty to correct
material, initially erroneous, incomplete, or misleading statements from
the duty to update statements that have become materially erroneous,
incomplete, or misleading over time. Third, the original statement must
220 Id. at 17.
221 Id. (quoting Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc. 742 F.2d 751, 758 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985)). For a discussion of the Greenfield case, see supra text accompa-
nying notes 143-55.
222 Polaroid II, 910 F.2d at 17. See infra Part III.C for interpretation of the court's usage
of the word "correct" in this context.
223 For a discussion of Phillips Petroleum, see supra text accompanying notes 156-65.
Carl Schneider has argued that the Phillips Petroleum case, unlike Polaroid 11, serves as an
example where it would be appropriate to apply a duty to update because the original state-
ments were forward-oriented, and likely to be interpreted by the public as expressing the part-
nership's intentions for the future. To the extent that the partnership decided to deviate from
its announced intention, the public could reasonably expect the partnership to promptly dis-
close this development. Schneider, supra note 201, at 10. In addition to Phillips Petroleum,
the court in Polaroid I1 also cited Wilson v. Comtech Telecommunications Corp., 648 F.2d 88
(2d Cir. 1981), which discussed in dicta the duty to update, but did not contribute much to the
already established case law. Polaroid II, 910 F.2d at 17.
224 See supra text accompanying note 222.
225 Since Polaroid II, the First Circuit has still not expounded upon what the "special
circumstances" entail. See, e.g., Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1219 (lst Cir.
1996); see also infra Part V.G (discussing Shaw).
226 See supra text accompanying note 222.
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be forward-looking. 227 Fourth, the statement must be one on which an
investor could reasonably rely.228 As with the first requirement, the en
banc court did not elaborate on what type of statement upon which it
would be reasonable for an investor to rely. Fifth, the forward-looking
statement must have a "clear meaning." 229 The courts will have to apply
a test, either subjective or objective, to determine whether a statement
has the required clear meaning.. Sixth, there must be a "change." 230 Sev-
enth, the change must cause the prior statement to become materially
misleading. 231
The third requirement represents the most significant contribution of
Polaroid 11,232 and serves as a critical distinction between the duty to
correct, which applies to historical statements, and the duty to update,
which pertains to forward-looking statements. The court's reference to a
"forward intent and connotation" reveals that the court intended for a
duty to update to apply only to forward-looking statements. This empha-
sis represents a dramatic departure from Polaroid I, which sought to im-
pose on Polaroid a duty to update historical facts that had become
misleading as a result of subsequent events.233 The end of the en banc
court opinion reveals that the court (i) recognized that the panel in Polar-
oid I ascribed an excessively broad scope to the duty to update and (ii)
intended to restrict the scope of the duty to forward-looking statements:
"We understand the amici apprehension because of the panel opinion's
not only requiring update, but requiring it in terms of a new duty that
227 See supra text accompanying note 222.
228 See supra text accompanying note 222. Although similar to the materiality element of
a Rule 1Ob-5 claim, reliance is a separate element. See HAzEN, supra note 55, § 13.5B, at 806
(explaining that "[t]he reliance requirement is a corollary of materiality... [that] applies in
securities fraud cases" (footnote omitted)).
229 See supra text accompanying note 222.
230 See supra text accompanying note 222.
231 This materiality requirement derives from the Polaroid II court's quoted language
from Greenfield with which the court acknowledged that it "may agree." See supra text ac-
companying notes 221-22. In addition, the materiality criterion can be implied, given that it is
a required element of a Rule lOb-5 claim. See supra text accompanying note 72. Subsequent
cases that have cited Polaroid II have found that the Polaroid HI dicta requires that the state-
ment must become "materially misleading" to be actionable. See, e.g., Rubinstein v. Collins,
20 F.3d 160, 170 n.41 (5th Cir. 1994); Colby v. Hologic, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 204,213 (D. Mass.
1993). But cf. Hillson Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 219 n.13 (4th Cir.
1994) (noting that "[d~icta in some cases can be read to suggest a possible duty to update even
immaterial statements in that those cases do not expressly limit the asserted duty to update to
statements that are material" (citing Polaroid 11, 910 F.2d 10, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc);
In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1245 (3d Cir. 1989))).
232 See Hayes, supra note 123, at 955 (stating that the court in Polaroid 11 was the first to
maintain that "a statement must be future-oriented in order to give rise to a duty to update").
233 It is interesting to note that the statement at issue in Greenfield, see supra text accom-
panying note 146, was probably historical in nature. Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d
751, 759-60 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985). Therefore, as in Polaroid I,
the court in Greenfield was willing to apply a duty to update to an historical statement.
1998]
634 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
had never been undertaken. With those errors corrected, however, we
see no reason to proceed further. Plaintiffs have no case. '234
The dissent also lends support to the interpretation that Polaroid II
narrowed the scope of the duty to update to forward-looking state-
ments.235 Judge Bownes interpreted the majority opinion to signify that
"corporations have no duty to update statements of past historical fact
that were accurate when made but that have simply become stale with the
passage of time."'236
4. Public Policy Considerations
Restricting application of the duty to update to forward-oriented
statements was a prudent public policy decision. This restriction should
benefit companies. The court recognized the concern of the amici curiae
that the imposition of a duty to update statements of "historical fact...
could inhibit disclosures all together. '2 37 Of perhaps greater concern, a
duty to update historical statements would lead companies to incur sub-
stantial disclosure costs and expose companies to perpetual liability be-
cause "important subsequent events (following the filing of an accurate
... quarter[ly] report) will always render the required quarterly snapshot
out-of-date. '238 In fact, "a duty to update all historical information could
be interpreted as a continuing duty to provide daily updates of financial
statement balances. '239 Such a duty would necessitate sweeping changes
to the periodic reporting rules and regulations that the Exchange Act
prescribes.240
However, imposition of a broad duty to update forward-looking
statements that become materially inaccurate or misleading could be very
burdensome for companies, given that, under the duty to correct, they
already must correct material historical statements that were initially er-
234 Polaroid II, 910 F.2d at 18. The amici had been concerned about the implications for
management and the private bar of imposing a duty to update historical facts. See supra note
208 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 237.
235 See Dougherty, supra note 188, at 11.
236 Polaroid II, 910 F.2d at 21 (Bownes, J., dissenting).
237 Id. at 17; see also Block et al., supra note 10, at 174-75 (warning that a broad duty to
update "'provides a powerful deterrent to voluntary disclosure"'); Schneider, supra note 101,
at 84-85 (same).
238 Hayes, supra note 123, at 963 (quoting Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Reversing
the Judgment of the Trial Court of the Associated Industries of Massachusetts & the New
England Legal Foundation at 2 (emphasis omitted), Polaroid 11, 910 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1990)
(en banc) (No. 89-1171)); see also Block et al., supra note 10, at 173-74 (discussing the
considerable burdens and costs companies would incur if a duty to update covered historical
statements); Dougherty, supra note 188, at 9 (explaining how the application of a duty to
update to historical statements "opens the door to liability with no clear stopping point").
239 Hayes, supra note 123, at 963.
240 See Block et al., supra note 10, at 173.
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roneous.24 1 A desire to avoid the costs and burdens of updating prior
disclosures, as well as liability for statements that become materially
misleading, may deter companies from making forward-looking state-
ments. The Polaroid II court tried to ensure that the duty to update
would have a limited scope. For example, the "special circumstances,"
reliance, and materiality requirements should ensure that imposition of
the duty to update would be relatively rare.242 Moreover, courts can nar-
rowly construe each of these elements, which would further limit liabil-
ity.24 3 In short, the Polaroid II court's refusal to recognize a duty to
update historical statements benefits companies, but its dicta discussing
the potential application of the duty to forward-looking statements may
prove detrimental to companies, and thus lead to an unwillingness to
make forward-looking statements.
The decision in Polaroid II should sufficiently protect investors,
thereby rendering it consistent with the legislative intent underlying sec-
tion 10(b).244 Investors should benefit from the court's emphasis on the
importance of truthful and complete disclosure by companies at the time
of issuance. In the case of historical statements, it is fair to conclude that
most investors recognize that these statements will not remain accurate
indefinitely.24 5 Therefore, the Polaroid II refusal to impose on compa-
nies a duty to update statements of historical fact should not harm the
public. Moreover, the public does not need protection from historical
statements (other than that which the duty to correct provides) because
they cannot become false or misleading as a result of subsequent events;
they only concern circumstances existing at the time when the company
made the statements. 24 6
In contrast, future-oriented statements, which investors and securi-
ties professionals desire in order to make informed investment deci-
sions,24 7 can become false and misleading. Investors expect companies
to ensure that projections are current.24 8 They thus may need the protec-
tion that Polaroid I provides in the form of a duty to update forward-
looking statements that have become materially misleading. The First
Circuit's efforts to limit the scope of the duty to update forward-looking
241 See infra Part HI.C.
242 See supra text accompanying notes 224, 228, 231.
243 See infra Part V.B.
244 See supra Part I.A.
245 See Hayes, supra note 123, at 962 (citing Supplemental Brief of Defendant-Appellant/
Appellee Polaroid Corp. on Rehearing En Banc at 19, Polaroid II, 910 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1990)
(en banc) (89-1171, 89-1172)).
246 See Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1332 n.3 (7th Cir. 1995).
247 See infra note 351 and accompanying text.
248 See Hayes, supra note 123, at 962 (citing Supplemental Brief, supra note 245, at 19);
Brodsky, supra note 201, at 3.
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statements by requiring the seven criteria249 may admittedly deprive in-
vestors of some protection. However, this restriction on the scope of the
duty is necessary because a broad duty to update will harm investors if it
discourages companies from making forward-looking statements.
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF DISTINGUISHING THE DUTES TO CORRECT
AND UPDATE
As the foregoing discussion of public policy considerations sug-
gests, the Polaroid 1I distinction between the duties to correct and update
has important ramifications for companies, investors, and the securities
markets as a whole. One should not view the case as merely a resolution
of a legal semantics problem.
Most scholars properly interpreted Polaroid 1I as preserving the
duty to correct statements that were initially false, incomplete, or mis-
leading,250 and narrowing the duty to update to apply to only forward-
looking statements.25 1 However, a minority school of thought has con-
strued the Polaroid II dicta as recognizing a duty to correct forward-
looking statements that were truthful when made, but became false or
misleading due to subsequent events. 252 This interpretation subsumes a
duty to update under a broadened duty to correct that already requires
correction of initially erroneous, historical statements.
This construction represents a misreading of Polaroid I which rec-
ognized a duty to update forward-looking statements under "special cir-
cumstances" as "a quite different duty" from the duty to correct.253
Furthermore, the Polaroid I court used language which clearly distin-
guished between the duties to correct and update. The court did not sug-
gest a "correction" of forward-looking statements (on which investors
could reasonably rely and that had become materially false or misleading
as a result of later events), but "more exactly, further disclosure." 254 The
phrase "more exactly" reveals that the court saw this duty as distinct
from the duty to correct. The court presumably chose the word "correct"
to set up the contrast with the concept of an "update." In addition, in the
wake of Polaroid II, many courts have cited the decision as evidence of a
judicial recognition of the duty to update.255
249 See supra text accompanying notes 224-31.
250 See, e.g., Block et al., supra note 10, at 172.
251 See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 201, at 10.
252 See, e.g., Block et al., supra note 10, at 158.
253 Polaroid II, 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc).
254 Id. (emphasis added).
255 See, e.g., In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1431-32 (3d Cir.
1997) (citing Polaroid II in recognition of a duty to update without imposing it under the
particular facts); Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir. 1995)
(acknowledging Polaroid Is recognition of a duty to update, but declining to recognize it in
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An interpretation of Polaroid II that subsumes the duty to update
under a broader duty to correct also understates the significance of the
distinction between the two duties that Polaroid II emphasized. The du-
ties trigger different disclosure obligations for companies, and therefore,
influence the extent to which investors will receive accurate information
to different degrees. In jurisdictions that recognize a duty to update,
companies must be prepared to incur the costs and burdens of updating
forward-looking statements that have become materially inaccurate or
misleading, which are in addition to the costs and burdens of correcting
initially inaccurate, historical statements that they must correct under the
almost universally accepted duty.to correct.25 6 Recognition of a duty to
update not only exposes companies to potential liability for a failure to
discharge its duty, but also to frivolous lawsuits.257 Defense of such law-
suits will be expensive.
Polaroid Irs distinction between the duties also impacts investors.
While a duty to update may prove burdensome for companies, it may
protect investors. 258 In jurisdictions that recognize a duty to update, in-
vestors should receive more accurate information from companies. The
duty to correct should prompt companies to make further disclosures that
correct originally inaccurate, historical statements that affect investors'
investment decisions. Recognition of a duty to update should addition-
ally benefit investors, for it should increase the accuracy of material, for-
ward-looking statements.
the Seventh Circuit); Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 170 n.41 (5th Cir. 1994) (recognizing
the duty in dicta); Rand v. M/A-Com, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 242, 257 (D. Mass. 1992) (citing
Polaroid II and recognizing a duty to update); Evanowski v. Bankworcester Corp., 788 F.
Supp. 611, 615 (D. Mass. 1991) (recognizing the duty to update; however, rejecting its appli-
cation because the original disclosure, like that in Polaroid, "remained precisely correct there-
after" (quoting Polaroid HI, 910 F.2d at 17)). However, as Edward Brodsky has pointed out,
courts have also cited Polaroid II "in opposition to" a duty to update. Edward Brodsky, The
Duty to Update Forward-Looking Statements, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 9, 1995, at 3. More precisely,
these courts have cited Polaroid 11 and proceeded to decline to (i) recognize the duty in their
jurisdiction, see Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1332, or (ii) impose the duty under the particular facts,
see Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1431-32. Brodsky cites, among other cases, Colby v.
Hologic, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 204 (D. Mass. 1993). Brodsky, supra, at 3 n.17. In Colby, the
court cited Polaroid 1I in support of "a duty to disclose... only to correct or update what
would otherwise be a materially misleading prior statement," but declined to impose such a
duty in light of the company's merely "'vague"' statement and "cautionary" projection.
Colby, 817 F. Supp. at 213. Therefore, the court in Colby still appears to recognize the duty to
update. It is interesting to note that the United States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts is located within the First Circuit, which rendered the en banc decision in Polaroid IL
Therefore, a comparison of Evanowski, decided in 1991, and Rand, decided one year later,
with the 1993 Colby decision, reveals that even in the First Circuit, courts have been reluctant
to impose the duty to update as defined in the Polaroid 11 dicta. See infra Part IV.A; see also
Part V.G (discussing duty to update cases that the First Circuit decided in 1996).
256 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
257 See infra note 309 and accompanying text.
258 See supra Part I.B.4.
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However, investors only benefit if companies make forward-looking
statements. Imposition of a duty to correct will not discourage compa-
nies from making forward-looking statements, for, as the First Circuit in
Polaroid 11 explained,259 the duty only applies to historical statements.
On the other hand, imposition of a duty to update, especially a broad
duty, may dissuade companies from making forward-looking disclo-
sures.2 60 It is therefore easy to see how Polaroid irs distinction between
the duties to correct and update has important consequences for both
companies and investors. The courts deciding cases after Polaroid 11
would have to decide the best way to protect investors from materially
misleading, forward-looking statements without discouraging companies
from making future-oriented statements.
IV. THE UNCERTAIN AFTERMATH OF POLAROID H
Although the legal community considered Polaroid I a significant
case, the court's opinion did not bring the much needed uniformity to the
case law either within or outside the First Circuit. In fact, as the cases
discussed below reveal, 261 there are courts that remain confused about
the difference between the duties to correct and update. Similarly, cer-
tain courts have recognized the duty to update, while others have rejected
the duty. This Part analyzes numerous post-Polaroid II cases addressing
the duty to update. Throughout this analysis, this Part attempts to iden-
tify similarities and differences between these cases in order to better
assess the current status of the duty to update. It also evaluates the status
of the duty in light of the PSLRA.
A. EVA NOWSKI v. BAVKWORCESTER CORP., 2 6 2 RAND V. M/A-CoM,
NC.,2 6 3 AND COLBY V. HOLOGIC, NC.
2 64
In Evanowski, the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts unsurprisingly followed the First Circuit's recent Polaroid
11 opinion. The court refused to impose on the defendants a duty to up-
date statements regarding the status of merger negotiations, which the
plaintiff alleged were false and misleading. 265 Finding that the state-
259 See supra Part Ill.B.4.
260 See supra Part HI.B.4; infra text accompanying note 349.
261 The cases discussed herein do not represent all of the cases since Polaroid II that have
addressed the duty to update. This Part tries to focus on the cases that courts have cited most
frequently, or are the most likely to become the law in a given circuit. However, it also
examines certain cases that have far less precedential value when they either belong to a poten-
tially important line of cases or remind the reader that courts continue to misunderstand the
difference between the duties to correct and update.
262 788 F. Supp. 611 (D. Mass. 1991).
263 824 F. Supp. 242 (D. Mass. 1992).
264 817 F. Supp. 204 (D. Mass. 1993).
265 Evanowski, 788 F. Supp. at 614-15.
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ments were "'precisely accurate,"' the court, continuing to follow the
reasoning of Polaroid II, held that "none of the... statements or omis-
sions were so incomplete as to mislead at the time they were made. The
mere failure to disclose additional related information that may have
been 'interesting, marketwise,' does not result in lOb-5 liability. '266 The
court did not impose a duty to update because, as in Polaroid II, the
initial disclosure did not become inaccurate or misleading as a result of
subsequent developments. In short, they "remained precisely correct
thereafter. '267 Quoting Polaroid II, the court explained that, "[a]ssuming
the challenged statements or omissions should even be characterized as
forward looking," the defendants were not under a duty to update disclo-
sure regarding "matters outside the scope of the initial disclosure."268
In 1992, the United States District Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts in Rand cited Polaroid II in support of a duty to update.269 The
Rand court explained that "[a] prediction, although true when made, may
nevertheless become misleading due to subsequent events." 270 The court
properly distinguished the duty to correct from the duty to update, ex-
plaining that even though the defendant company's original "statement
was not, as a matter of law, untrue or misleading at the time it was made,
there [was] a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the statement
became misleading in light of [a subsequent e]stimate."'271 The court
thus held that "there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning
whether M/A-Con had a duty to update the [original] statement at the
time [a subsequent e]stimate was distributed to senior management."2 72
In the following year, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Massachusetts declined in Colby to impose the Polaroid II duty to
update on a company that had made a "vague" statement and a "caution-
ary" projection. 273 The court cited the "general rule" of Polaroid II in
support of "a duty to disclose ... only to correct or update what would
otherwise be a materially misleading prior statement. '274 The court com-
pared the nature of the company's statement and prediction with that of
Polaroid's quarterly report, and held that "[t]he facts of [Polaroid II], no
less than its general rule, mandate a rejection of Colby's non-disclosure
266 Id. (quoting Polaroid II, 910 F.2d 10, 16-18 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc).
267 Id. at 615 (quoting Polaroid 11, 910 F.2d at 17).
268 Id. (quoting Polaroid II, 910 F.2d at 17).
269 Rand v. M/A Com, Inc., 824 F. Supp. 242, 257 (D. Mass. 1992).
270 Id. (citing In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1245 (3d Cir. 1989);
Kirby v. Cullinet Software, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 1444, 1450 (D. Mass. 1989)).
271 Id.
272 Id.
273 Colby v. Hologic, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 204, 213 (D. Mass. 1993).
274 Id. This assessment of the dicta in Polaroid II is somewhat ambiguous because it does
not distinguish the duty to correct an initially misleading statement from the duty to update a
statement that became misleading due to subsequent events. See supra note 40.
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claim. '275 The court's comparison revealed that "Hologic's prior ...
statement [was] as vague as Polaroid's ... advertisement, but Hologic's
.. balancing prediction... [was] more cautionary than the overall tenor
of Polaroid's challenged quarterly report."276 The court emphasized that
in Polaroid II, Polaroid was aware that Polavision was losing money
when it published its quarterly report, which failed to disclose this
fact.277 On the other hand, in Colby, the plaintiff failed to offer evidence
that orders for Hologic's products had decreased as of the time when a
company executive declined to provide projections of earnings. 278 As a
result, the court concluded that "[i]f Polaroid owed no duty of further
disclosure because 'what was revealed [was] not so incomplete as to mis-
lead,' . . . then no such duty can be imputed to Hologic. ' ' 279 In short, the
court appeared to recognize a duty to update in circumstances that were
not present in the case. As discussed below, the First Circuit revisited
the duty to update in 1996 in three cases; however, in contrast to the
three district court cases discussed in this Section, it failed to cite Polar-
oid 11.280
B. IN RE TIME WARNER INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION 2 8 1
The plaintiffs alleged in this Second Circuit case that Time Warner
made misleading statements that (i) misrepresented the company's pro-
gress toward entering certain strategic partnerships and (ii) omitted dis-
closure that the company was alternatively contemplating an equity
offering. 282 The statements addressing the strategic partnerships did not
trigger a duty to correct because the court found "no suggestion that the
factual assertions contained in any of the[ ] statements were false when
the statements were made. '283
275 Colby, 817 F. Supp. at 213.
276 Id.; see supra Part HL.A (discussing facts in Polaroid litigation). The Colby court did
not mention the bespeaks caution doctrine, see supra Part I.C.2, with respect to the cautionary
prediction; however, the doctrine would provide further support for the court's decision not to
impose on Hologic a duty to update this prediction. See infra Part IV.D (discussing how the
Fourth Circuit in Hillson Partners Ltd. Partnership. v. Adage, Inc. found that the alleged mate-
rially misleading statements contained cautionary language, and refused to impose a duty to
update on the defendants). But see infra Part IV.C (discussing how the Fifth Circuit in Rubin-
stein v. Collins recognized the duty to update despite the defendants' inclusion of cautionary
language).
277 See Colby, 817 F. Supp. at 213; supra Part IH.A.
278 See Colby, 817 F. Supp. at 213.
279 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Polaroid II, 910 F.2d 10, 13, 16 (1st Cir.
1990) (en bane)).
280 See infra Part IV.G.
281 9 F.3d 259 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Ross v. ZVI Trading Corp.
Employees' Money Purchase Pension Plan, 511 U.S. 1017 (1994).
282 See id. at 262.
283 Id. at 266.
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The majority opinion began with a bitter complaint that section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 were unsatisfactory, providing insufficient gui-
dance in securities fraud cases. 284 The Second Circuit recognized that "a
duty to update opinions and projections may arise if the original opinions
-or projections have become misleading as the result of intervening
events. 285 However, the court did not impose this duty to update the
statements regarding the strategic partnerships, for they "lack[ed] the sort
of definite positive projections that might require later correction," and
therefore, "did not become materially misleading when the talks did not
proceed well." 286 Despite this usage of the word "correction," the court
was addressing the question of whether Time Warner had a duty to up-
date its prior statements. The indefiniteness of the statements may speak
to the absence of three of the elements that the Polaroid II dicta required
for a duty to update: the statements appeared to (i) not be statements on
which reasonable investors could "be expected to rely"; (ii) lack a suffi-
ciently "clear meaning"; and (iii) be immaterial given their indefinite-
ness, which would prevent them from becoming "materially
misleading."287 In addition, the statements were not future-oriented. As
a result, the Second Circuit's refusal to impose on Time Warner a duty to
update appears consistent with Polaroid II.
On the other hand, the court found that Time Warner might be
under a duty to disclose that it had been considering a stock offering.288
This "secret information render[ed]" its original disclosure, which only
discussed the strategic alliances option, "materially misleading. '289 The
court supported a finding of this duty because the statements were for-
ward-oriented, and of such a nature that "reasonable investors" might
interpret them to indicate that Time Warner planned to pursue only the
strategic partnerships. 290 The court did narrow its holding to the facts of
the case: "[W]e hold that when a corporation is pursuing a specific busi-
ness goal and announces that goal as well as an intended approach for
reaching it, it may come under an obligation to disclose other approaches
to reaching the goal when those approaches are under active and serious
consideration.",291
284 See id. at 263-64.
285 Id. at 267.
286 Id.
287 See supra text accompanying notes 228-29, 231.
288 See Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 267-68.
289 Id. at 268.
290 Id.
291 Id.
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C. RUBINSTEIV V. COLLINS 2 9 2
The Fifth Circuit cited Polaroid II in Rubinstein in support of its
recognition of the duty to update.2 93 The holding of the Rubinstein case,
which rejected a per se application of the bespeaks caution doctrine de-
spite the defendants' usage of cautionary language,2 94 did not turn on the
duty to update. However, the court addressed the duty in a footnote. 295
While the court only dedicated two sentences of the opinion to discuss-
ing the duty, it is worth mentioning because Rubinstein demonstrates that
even after Polaroid II, there are still courts that do not properly distin-
guish the duty to correct from the duty to update. The plaintiffs "alleged
that . . . [certain] optimistic projections became materially misleading
when subsequent testing and production undermined the basis of those
projections. '296 The court responded to this allegation: "We note that, at
least facially, it appears that defendants have a duty under Rule lOb-5 to
correct statements if those statements have become materially mislead-
ing in light of subsequent events. '2 97
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit recognized the substance of the duty to
update, as defined in Polaroid II, but, like many courts both before and
after Polaroid II, it misidentified the duty as the duty to correct. It is
interesting to note that while the court in Colby v. Hologic, Inc. refused
to impose a duty to update on Hologic, in part, because of the cautionary
nature of the company's prediction, 29 the Rubinstein court recognized
the duty to update even. though the defendants used cautionary
language.299
D. HILLSON PARTNERS LTD. PARTNERSHIP V. ,DAGE INC.3 ° °
While federal district courts in Massachusetts 30 1 and the Second 30 2
and Fifth Circuits30 3 thus have recognized a duty to update similar to that
which the First Circuit described in Polaroid II, the Fourth Circuit
reached a different conclusion in 1994 in Hillson Partners regarding the
duty to update predictions. In this litigation, the plaintiffs alleged that
Adage had duties to update or correct predictions, contained in quarterly
292 20 F.3d 160 (5th Cir. 1994).
293 Id. at 170 n.41.
294 Id. at 166-68; see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
295 See Rubinstein, 20 F.3d at 170 n.41.
296 Id.
297 Id. (emphasis added) (citing, inter alia, Polaroid II, 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (en
banc); In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1245 (3d Cir. 1989)).
298 See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text.
299 Rubinstein, 20 F.3d at 170 n.41.
300 42 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 1994).
301 See supra Part IV.A.
302 See supra Part IV.B.
303 See supra Part IV.C.
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reports and press releases, that had become erroneous. 304 The court held
that "[a]ssuming that there can ever be a 'duty to update,' there was no
such duty here. °305
The court made a public policy argument: "To require Adage con-
tinually to correct and modify its projections would inevitably discourage
the types of disclosure the securities laws seek to encourage .... '[Such]
a duty to disclose [projections] would have required virtually constant
statements by [the issuer] in order not to mislead investors.' "306 The
court concluded that a duty to update projections was "'impractical, if
not unreasonable.' "307 Quoting from its 1993 decision in Raab v. Gen-
eral Physics Corp.,30 8 the court continued its public policy analysis:
"[I]mposing liability on companies for predictions of future growth,
which are often and inevitably wrong, would lead to further proliferation
of lawsuits and would be contrary to the 'goal of full disclosure underly-
ing the securities laws.'"309
Following the Second Circuit's decision in In re Time Warner Inc.
Securities Litigation,310 the court explained that "[t]here is no duty to
update [predictions that it deemed to be immaterial and not "pled with
sufficient particularity to allege a claim of fraud"] . . .on the basis of
subsequent events. ' 31' The Fourth Circuit, however, applied the holding
of Time Warner to a different fact pattern. In Hillson Partners, the opti-
mistic predictions were of a more specific nature than Time Warner's
disclosures regarding the progress of its negotiations toward entering
304 Hillson Partners, 42 F.3d at 219.
305 Id.
306 Id. (citation omitted) (last alteration in original) (quoting Walker v. Action Indus., 802
F.2d 703, 710 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987)).
307 Id. (quoting Walker, 802 F.2d at 710).
308 4 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 1993).
309 Hillson Partners, 42 F.3d at 220 (footnote omitted) (quoting Raab, 4 F.3d at 290).
The Hillson Partners court quoted other policy-oriented language earlier in its opinion from
Raab that provides further support for the argument that the duty to update should not apply to
"predictions of future growth":
Predictions of future growth... will almost always prove to be wrong in hindsight.
If a company predicts twenty-five percent growth, that is simply the company's best
guess as to how the future will play out. As a statistical matter, twenty percent and
thirty percent growth are both nearly as likely as twenty-five. If growth proves less
than predicted, buyers will sue; if growth proves greater, sellers will sue. Imposing
liability would put companies in a whipsaw, with a lawsuit almost a certainty. Such
liability would deter companies from discussing their prospects, and the securities
markets would be deprived of the information those predictions offer. We believe
that this is contrary to the goal of full disclosure underlying the securities laws ....
Id. at 214 (quoting Raab, 4 F.3d at 290).
310 See supra text accompanying note 286.
311 Hillson Partners, 42 F.3d at 219 (citing In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d
259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Ross v. Zvi Trading Corp. Employees' Money
Purchase Pension Plan, 511 U.S. 1017 (1994)).
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strategic alliances. 312 On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit's finding in
Hillson Partners that the alleged materially misleading statements in-
cluded cautionary language, and its endorsement of the bespeaks caution
doctrine,3 13 may distinguish them from Time Warner's statement. This
finding, among other reasons, led the Hillson Partners court to conclude
that the statements were not "material under the federal securities
laws," 3 14 and therefore, contributed to its rationale for refusing to impose
on the defendants a duty to update. The Fourth Circuit, like the district
court in Colby v. Hologic, Inc.,315 and unlike the Fifth Circuit in Rubin-
stein,3 16 thus was unwilling to impose a duty to update on a company
that made predictions couched in cautionary language.
To the extent that the holding in Hillson Partners is interpreted to
mean only that a company does not have a duty to update immaterial
projections which plaintiffs have pled with inadequate particularity, it is
not inconsistent with the prior duty to update case law-including Polar-
oid II. However, the court's application of the Time Warner court's
holding to different facts, and its expressed skepticism regarding whether
"there can ever be a 'duty to update,"' 317 suggest that the case may in-
stead represent a rejection of the Polaroid II dicta regarding the duty to
update. Later cases have cited Hillson Partners in support of a rejection
of the duty to update forward-looking statements. 318
E. ST-RANSKY V. CUMMINS ENGINE Co., INC 3 19
The Seventh Circuit in 1995 followed the Fourth Circuit's lead in
departing from Polaroid II. The court acknowledged that the duties to
correct and update represented "avenues ... kicked around by courts,
litigants and academics alike" to establish "a false or misleading state-
ment" for the purposes of Rule lOb-5. 320 The court also characterized
the legal distinction between the two duties as in a "confused state of the
law. 321 As a result of this confusion, the Stransky court noted that
"[l]itigants [including Stransky] often fail to distinguish between these
theories.., and to delineate their exact parameters." 322 Therefore, confu-
312 See supra text accompanying notes 282-86.
313 Hillson Partners, 42 F.3d at 218-19; see supra note 62 and accompanying text.
314 Hillson Partners, 42 F.3d at 219.
315 See supra text accompanying notes 273-75; supra note 276 and accompanying text.
316 See supra text accompanying note 299.
317 Hillson Partners, 42 F.3d at 219.
318 See, e.g., PPM Am., Inc. v. Marriott Corp., 875 F. Supp. 289, 300-01 (D. Md. 1995).
319 51 F.3d 1329 (7th Cir. 1995).
320 Id. at 1331.
321 Id. at 1336.
322 Id. at 1331.
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sion still existed five years after Polaroid Il's apparent clarification of
the distinction between the duties to correct and update.323
Reciting the distinction made in Polaroid II, the court explained that
the duty to correct "applies when a company makes a historical statement
that, at the time made, the company believed to be true, but as revealed
by subsequently discovered information actually was not."324 In con-
trast, the duty to update applies to "a forward-looking statement-a pro-
jection-that because of subsequent events becomes untrue.'' 325 While
the court recognized the duty to correct, it explained that "[t]his court has
never embraced [a duty to update] ... and we decline to do so now. '326
The Seventh Circuit rejected the duty to update because it con-
cluded that Rule lOb-5 "implicitly precludes basing liability on circum-
stances that arise after the speaker makes the statement."327 Adding that
"[t]he securities laws typically do not act as a Monday Morning
Quarterback," the court argued that they "'approach matters from an ex
ante perspective: just as a statement true when made does not become
fraudulent because things unexpectedly go wrong, so a statement materi-
ally false when made does not become acceptable because it happens to
come true."' 3 28 These concerns "g[a]ve [the court] serious pause in im-
posing a duty to update. '329
In Stransky, the plaintiff sued defendants for committing fraud when
they issued various press releases that were allegedly false or mislead-
ing.33 0 These press releases contained both historical statements and pro-
jections.331 According to the court, "a projection can lead to liability
under Rule lOb-5 only if it was not made in good faith or was made
323 In In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, decided in June 1997, the
plaintiffs similarly did not understand the difference between the duties to correct and update.
The Third Circuit noted that "[allthough plaintiffs characterize their claim as a 'duty to cor-
rect' claim, they appear to be asserting both a duty to correct and a duty to update." In re
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1430 (3d Cir. 1997). The court later in the
opinion explained that the "plaintiffs' [duty to correct] claim is better characterized as a duty to
update claim." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
324 Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1331-32 (citing Polaroid II, 910 F.2d 10, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1990)
(en banc)).
325 ld. at 1332 (citing Polaroid 11, 910 F.2d at 17; Rosenblum, supra note 10). The court
explained that "[n]o duty to update an historical statement can logically exist. By definition an
historical statement is addressing only matters at the time of the statement. Thus, that circum-
stances subsequently change cannot render an historical statement false or misleading." Id. at
1332 n.3.
326 ld. at 1332.
327 Id.
328 Il (quoting Pommer v. Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d 620, 623 (7th Cir. 1992)).
329 1d.
330 Id. at 1331.
331 See id.
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without a reasonable basis." 332 The court held that defendants may have
been under a duty to correct the historical statements, to the extent that
they subsequently learned that their initial statements were inaccurate. 333
As for the projections, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff could
plead on remand that they "were unreasonable when made or were not
made in good faith."334
Despite the fact that the court refused to recognize the duty to up-
date projections, the court curiously noted that "a company can limit its
liability by 'updating' a prediction that was unreasonable when made or
made in bad faith. '335 In addition, the court did qualify its holding by
explaining that its position on the duty to update was restricted to certain
forward-looking statements, in particular, projections and predictions. 336
The Seventh Circuit "express[ed] no opinion on whether the outcome
would be the same if a plaintiff contested statements of intent to take a
certain action."337
While the Second Circuit in In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Liti-
gation,338 and the Fourth Circuit in Hillson Partners3 39 refused to impose
on companies a duty to update indefinite, vague projections, the Stransky
court held that companies were not under a duty to update predictions or
projections-apparently irrespective of whether they were indefinite or
vague. Therefore, Stransky should probably be viewed as a rejection of
the duty to update projections, especially when compared to the deci-
sions cited above that limited rejection of the duty to indefinite or vague
predictions.
However, the qualification regarding the "outcome... if a plaintiff
contested statements of intent to take a certain action" 340 may suggest
that Stransky instead represents a severe narrowing of the duty to update,
332 Id. at 1333; see also infra text accompanying notes 336-37 (discussing that the court's
holding regarding the duty to update only applied to projections). The Stransky court's lan-
guage resembled that of the safe harbor which provides that "an [issuer's forward-looking]
statement within the coverage of [Rules 175(b) or 3b-6(b)] ... shall be deemed not to be a
fraudulent statement... unless it is shown that such statement was made or reaffirmed without
a reasonable basis or was disclosed other than in good faith." 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175(a),
240.3b-6(a) (1997); see supra text accompanying notes 131-36.
333 Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1336.
334 Id.
335 Id. at 1333 n.9. This concession that "'updating"' a prior prediction, originally "un-
reasonable... or made in bad faith," can limit a company's liability seems to undermine the
court's earlier distinction between the duties to correct and update. Of course, the status of
disclosure "when made" is only a concern under a duty to correct. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 324-25.
336 See Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1332-33.
337 Id. at 1332 n.4.
338 See supra Part IV.B.
339 See supra Part IV.D.
340 Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1332 n.4.
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as previously conceived. Under this interpretation of the Stransky dicta,
a company would not be required to update projections, but it could have
a duty to update a material statement in which it expressed its intent to
take a particular action, if that statement became materially inaccurate or
misleading. Courts deciding duty to update cases in the Seventh Circuit
after Stransly have not cited the case to support this potential recognition
of a duty to update statements expressing intent to take a particular ac-
tion.341 Instead, they have cited Stransky in support of decisions that do
not recognize the duty to update. 342
F. THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM Acr OF 1995343
The post-Polaroid I decisions discussed thus far reveal that there is
inconsistency among the circuits regarding the duty to update. However,
Congress had an opportunity in December 1995 to clarify the duty in the
PSLRA. A codification of the duty to update or, alternatively, a statutory
rejection of the duty would obviously bind courts. In fact, the duty to
disclose line of cases expressly recognized this outcome. For example,
the second criterion in Roeder v. Alpha Industries, Inc. that can give rise
to a duty to disclose material facts was a "statute or regulation requiring
disclosure."344 Therefore, a recognition in the PSLRA of a duty to up-
date would trigger an affirmative duty to disclose additional material in-
formation that renders prior disclosure materially inaccurate or
misleading. Regrettably, Congress did not offer any such clarification.
The safe harbor for forward-looking statements codified in Rule 175
of the Securities Act and Rule 3b-6 of the Exchange Act did not bring
about a substantial increase in the disclosure of forward-looking state-
341 In fact, in Fry v. UAL Corp., the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois argued that "the reasoning underlying the [Stransky] court's refusal to embrace a
duty to update with respect to projections and predictions applies equally to statements of
intent." Fry v. UAL Corp., 895 F. Supp. 1018, 1052 (N.D. Mll. 1995), aff'd, 84 F.3d 936 (7th
Cir.), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 447
(1996). The court "conclud[ed] that the rule announced in Stransky should govern the case.
That is, that a statement of intent-like a projection or prediction-will result in liability only
if the plaintiff can establish that it was not made in good faith or upon a reasonable basis.' ld.
at 1053.
342 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 746 (7th Cir.), reh'g and sugges-
tion for reh'g en banc denied (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting the duty to update predictions); Grassi
v. Information Resources, Inc., 63 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting the duty to update
projections solely because subsequent events have rendered them inaccurate); Fry, 895 F.
Supp. at 1052-53 (rejecting the duty to update projections as well as statements of intent). Cf.
In re HealthCare Compare Corp. Sec. Litig., 75 F.3d 276, 282 (7th Cir. 1996) ("declin[ing] to
hold that Stransky adopted a bright-line rule that no duty to (update] exists in any. case"). See
infra Part IV.H for a discussion of HealthCare Compare and infra Part IV.I which analyzes
Eisenstadt.
343 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 199 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
344 See supra text accompanying note 39.
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ments.345 Three specific complaints about the safe harbor that explain
this outcome are particularly relevant to a discussion of the duty to up-
date. First, the safe harbor insufficiently protects companies because it
applies only to disclosures in SEC filings. 346 Second, the safe harbor
inadequately'insulates companies from the "mass shareholder litigation"
to which companies are exposed when they make forward-looking state-
ments. 347 Third, given its silence regarding the duties to correct and up-
date, the safe harbor "has created confusion over whether and when there
is a duty to correct or update projections once they are made. ' 348 This
failure to definitively establish the law regarding a duty to update has
prompted lawyers to advise their clients to refrain from making forward-
looking statements in order to avoid the potential "assum[ption]" of the
duty to update and the concomitant exposure to potential liability.349
This practice conflicts with the SEC's policy goal of promoting vol-
untary disclosure of forward-looking statements. 350 The SEC has noted
the significance of forward-looking statements:
Investors typically consider management's forward-
looking information important and useful in evaluating a
company's economic prospects and consequently in
making their investment decisions. Analysts and other
market participants report that they view consideration
of management's own performance projections, i.e.,
earnings and revenues, to be critical to their own fore-
casts of a company's future performance. As such, for-
ward-looking information is often considered a critical
component of investment recommendations made by
broker-dealers, investment advisors and other securities
professionals.35 1
345 See 1994 Safe Harbor Release, supra note 140, at 85,786. For a discussion of the safe
harbor, see supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
346 See 1994 Safe Harbor Release, supra note 140, at 85,786.
347 Id. at 85,786-87.
348 Id. at 85,787.
349 Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Selective Disclosure Can Be Perilous,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 18, 1994, at B4. For an explanation of how an imposition of a duty to update
predictions can place companies in an impossible position that will almost certainly lead to
litigation, see supra note 309 and accompanying text.
350 1994 Safe Harbor Release, supra note 140, at 85,786-87.
351 Id. at 85,779 (footnote omitted); see also Statement by the Commission on Disclosure
of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act Release No. 5362, [1972-1973
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,211, at 82,665, 82,667 (Feb. 2, 1973)
("[Pjrojections are currently widespread in the securities markets and are relied upon in the
investment process. Persons invest with the future in mind and the market value of a security
reflects the judgments of investors about the future economic performance of the issuer. Thus
projections are sought by all investors, whether institutional or individual.").
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In light of the significance of forward-looking statements, Congress and
the SEC obviously intended for the PSLRA to improve upon the existing
safe harbor rule.
1. Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements
Section 102 of the PSLRA introduced section 27A of the Securities
Act 35 2 and section 21E of the Exchange Act.353 These sections create a
safe harbor for forward-looking statements354 that is in addition to the
Rule 175 and Rule 3b-6 safe harbor.355 The safe harbor applies to writ-
ten and ora 3 5 6 forward-looking statements357 that a reporting issuer, a
person or "outside reviewer" acting on the issuer's behalf, or an under-
writer has made.358 There are two prongs via which an issuer can find
shelter in the safe harbor "in any private action... that is based on an
untrue statement of a material fact or omission of a material fact neces-
sary to make the statement not misleading. '359 The first prong consists
of two avenues: "the forward-looking statement is (i) identified as a for-
ward-looking statement, and is accompanied by meaningful cautionary
statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results to
differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement; or (ii) im-
material. '360 The second prong protects issuers if "the plaintiff fails to
352 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (Supp. 11995).
353 Id. § 78u-5.
354 See id §§ 77z-2(c), 78u-5(c).
355 See supra text accompanying notes 131-36.
356 For the provisions that govern the eligibility of oral forward-looking statements for the
safe harbor, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(2), 78u-5(c)(2).
357 The PSLRA's definition of forward-looking statement applies to more statements than
the Rule 175 and Rule 3b-6 safe harbor, which only protects statements contained in SEC
filings. See supra text accompanying notes 131-36 for a discussion of the Rule 175 and Rule
3b-6 safe harbor. For the PSLRA's definition of forward-looking statements, see 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77z-2(i), 78u-5(i).
Certain forward-looking statements are not eligible for the PSLRA safe harbor. See id.
§§ 77z-2(b), 78u-5(b). The most important of these exceptions are forward-looking statements
contained in financial statements that are prepared in accordance with generally accepted ac-
counting principles and forward-looking statements relating to rollup and going private trans-
actions, tender offers, and initial public offerings. See id.
358 Id. §§ 77z-2(a), 78u-5(a).
359 Ld. 77z-2(c)(1), 78u-5(c)(1).
360 Id. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(A), 78u-5(c)(1)(A). The Conference Committee Report for the
PSLRA elaborated on the requirement of "meaningful cautionary language":
The cautionary statements must convey substantive information about factors that
realistically could cause results to differ materially from those projected in the for-
ward-looking statement....
.. "Important" factors means the stated factors identified in the cautionary
statement must be relevant to the projection and must be of a nature that the factor or
factors could actually affect whether the forward-looking statement is realized....
... [T]he cautionary statements [must] identify important factors that could
cause results to differ materially-but not all factors. Failure to include the particu-
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prove that the forward-looking statement . . . was made with actual
knowledge... that the statement was false or misleading.13 61
Both avenues of the first prong of eligibility for the safe harbor ap-
pear to codify judicially recognized doctrines. The first avenue appears
to codify the bespeaks caution doctrine that many courts have invoked to
dismiss securities fraud cases on the ground that the sufficient cautionary
language in the forward-looking statements in question rendered them
immaterial or unreasonable bases upon which investors could rely.3 62
The second avenue is consistent with courts' efforts to dismiss securities
fraud claims based on immaterial statements.363 The second prong pro-
tects issuers in securities fraud cases because it requires plaintiffs to
prove that the defendant "made [the statement] with actual knowledge
... that the statement was false or misleading," which is in addition to
the Rule lOb-5 requirement that a plaintiff must prove that the defendant
acted with scienter.364
2. Implications for the Duty to Update
The PSLRA safe harbor thus provides that to the extent a reporting
issuer includes adequate cautionary language in a forward-looking state-
ment that meets the safe harbor's requirements, or if such a statement is
deemed immaterial, the safe harbor protects issuers from liability in a
private securities fraud action. This protection from liability in the form
of a safe harbor may suggest that the PSLRA insulates issuers from lia-
lar factor that ultimately causes the forward-looking statement not to come true will
not mean that the statement is not protected by the safe harbor....
A cautionary statement that misstates historical facts is not covered by the
[s]afe harbor.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 43-44 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 742-43.
361 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(B), 78u-5(c)(1)(B).
362 For a discussion of the bespeaks caution doctrine, see supra Part I.C.2. In the wake of
the PSLRA, many commentators have written about the safe harbor, the extent to which it
codifies the judge-created bespeaks caution doctrine, and its effect on the doctrine. See, e.g.,
Gerald S. Backman et al., Forward-Looking Statements and Cautionary Language After the
1995 Reform Act: An Empirical Study, in SAING IN "SAFE HARBORS": DRAFNG FORWARD-
LOOKING DIscLosuREs 153 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-1020,
1997); John F. Olson & David C. Mahaffey, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 and the "Bespeaks Caution" Doctrine, in I SWEEPING RFORM: LrrIGATING AND B-
SPEAKING CAUTION UNDER THE NEW SEcuRrrIEs LAW 529 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. B-923, 1996); Phillip D. Parker, The New Safe Harbor for Forward-
Looking Statements, in id. at 269; Julia B. Strickland & Mary D. Manesis, Litigating a Safe
Harbor: The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and the Bespeaks Caution Doc-
trine, in SWEEPING REFORM 147 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-
1996S, 1996); Erin M. Hardtke, Comment, What's Wrong with the Safe Harbor for Forward-
Looking Statements? A Call to the Securities and Exchange Commission to Reconsider Codi-
fication of the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 133 (1997).
363 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 286, 311.
364 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(c)(1)(B), 78u-5(c)(1)(B); see supra text accompanying note 72.
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bility arising from a failure to discharge a duty to update forward-looking
statements that meet the requirements of the safe harbor.3 65 However,
one can make an equally strong argument that the safe harbor does not
reject the judge-created duty to update. In other words, this interpreta-
tion maintains that the safe harbor protects issuers from liability-unless
they have breached a duty to update a forward-looking statement in a
jurisdiction that recognizes this duty.
Congress's few words regarding the duty to update did not resolve
this problem. The safe harbor that the PSLRA introduced includes a pro-
vision that states: "Nothing in this section shall impose upon any person
a duty to update a forward-looking statement." 366 A strict interpretation
of this language indicates that Congress did not reject the duty to update
that certain jurisdictions have already recognized. Congress may have
only declined to codify a duty to update, and thus rejected only an "im-
pos[ition]" of a statutory duty to update. However, members of Con-
gress, who opposed the PSLRA, have contended that this language
reverses the judicial recognition of the duty to update. 367 Commentators
have not reached a consensus regarding how the PSLRA has affected the
duty to update.3 68
Certainly if Congress intended to eliminate the duty, the courts
should not continue to impose it on issuers. However, even if Congress
solely decided not to discuss the duty, the underlying policy objectives of
the PSLRA suggest that the courts may, in response, reduce the scope of
365 The second prong of eligibility for the safe harbor, see supra text accompanying note
361, does not concern the duty to update. If a plaintiff proves that the defendant made the
statement "with actual knowledge... that the statement was false or misleading," this determi-
nation would be irrelevant in a duty to update claim because the duty only attaches to forward-
looking statements that become materially false or misleading. To the extent that the defend-
ant knew that the statement was false or misleading when it made the statement, the statement
cannot become false or misleading, for it always had been false or misleading.
366 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(d), 78u-5(d).
367 See Martha L. Cochran & Catherine Collins McCoy, The Safe Harbor for Forward-
Looking Statements, INsGs, Feb. 1996, at 14, 17.
368 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future of the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act: Or, Why the Fat Lady Has Not Yet Sung, 51 Bus. LAW. 975, 992 (1996) (Congress's
"statement borders on the tautological. Safe harbors do not by definition impose duties or
create liabilities; rather, they are exceptions from rules that do."); Marc I. Steinberg, Sympo-
sium: Securities Law After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act-Unfinished Business,
50 SMU L. Rev. 9, 16 (1996) (observing that "[ilt is unclear whether this language [regarding
the duty to update] is meant to eliminate the 'duty to update' any forward-looking statement or
merely to clarify that no implied 'duty to update' may be gleaned from this section"); John C.
Coffee, Jr., Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 30, 1995, at 5 (To
the extent the relevant jurisdiction recognizes a duty to update, the language in the PSLRA
"would seem to leave that duty unchanged and intact. Had Congress wanted to say that the
maker of a forward-looking statement is under no duty to update, notwithstanding any contrary
interpretation, it could have easily so provided. Instead, it appears to have compromised
ambiguously.").
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the duty to update.369 Encouraging companies to publicize projections
supports the underlying policy goal of the Exchange Act,370 because
these statements help investors make more informed decisions. 371 The
purpose of the duty to update is to protect investors from a company's
materially inaccurate or misleading statements. 372 However, a broad
duty to update will discourage companies from making forward-looking
statements, for it burdens companies with the obligation of further dis-
closure and also exposes them to liability for statements that were accu-
rate when made.373 In sum, a broad duty to update appears to be
irreconcilable with the public policy underlying Congress's adoption of
the safe harbor for forward-looking statements.
Congress's vague language in the PSLRA regarding the duty to up-
date has been uninfluential in two important ways. First, it has made
those issuers (and their lawyers), who were already averse to forward-
oriented statements in light of the uncertainty of the judicially recognized
duty to update, reluctant to make such voluntary disclosures. 374 Second,
it has thus far not influenced the existing duty to update case law. 375
Therefore, despite anticipation that Congress would clarify the status of
the duty to update, the judge-created duty to update remains, for now, in
the hands of judges.
G. SHA w v. DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CoRp., 3 7 6 GLASSMAN V.
COMPUTERVISION CoRp., 3 7 7 AND GROSS V. SUMMA FouR, Ic. 3 7 8
In 1996, the First Circuit revisited the duty to update controversy in
Shaw, Glassman, and Gross.379 As in Rubinstein v. Collins,380 the court
in Shaw addressed the duty to update in a footnote. 381 The court, appear-
ing to follow the First Circuit's dicta in Polaroid II, explained that the
duty to update did not apply to the defendants' statement announcing an
expected increase in "'service revenues' because it was "a statement of
369 See infra Part V.
370 See supra Part I.A.
371 See supra note 351 and accompanying text.
372 See supra text accompanying note 67.
373 See supra Part III.B.4; supra text accompanying note 349.
374 See infra text accompanying note 549.
375 See infra Part V.A.
376 82 F.3d 1194 (Ist Cir. 1996).
377 90 F.3d 617 (1st Cir. 1996).
378 93 F.3d 987 (1st Cir. 1996).
379 For a discussion of the First Circuit's decision in 1990 in Polaroid II, see supra Part
III.B. Between 1991 and 1993, federal district courts in Massachusetts decided three duty to
update cases discussed supra Part IV.A.
380 See supra text accompanying note 295.
381 Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1219 n.33.
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historical fact not alleged to be false."382 Interestingly, the court did not
cite Polaroid II for this proposition. Rather, it cited Serabian v. Amos-
keag Bank Shares, Inc. 383 as support.384 With respect to other forward-
looking statements that Digital Equipment made, the court maintained
that their "cautiously optimistic" nature "would not be actionable in the
first instance. 385 These statements "express[ed], at most, 'only the hope
of any company' for a positive future, and [like the statements in In re
Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation regarding the strategic partner-
ships,] 'lack[ed] the sort of definite positive projections that might re-
quire later correction." 386 Because the indefiniteness of the statements
rendered them presumably unreasonable bases for reliance, potentially
devoid of a clear meaning, and immaterial, the decision may be consis-
tent with Polaroid 11.387
The court held that "[w]hatever the circumstances in which a com-
pany might be subject to a duty to 'update' information previously dis-
closed, we do not think that the ... statements identified by plaintiffs are
of the kind that could trigger any such duty."388 Once again, the court
did not cite Polaroid II to support its discussion of the "the circum-
stances in which a company might be subject to a duty to 'update' infor-
mation previously disclosed. ' 389 In fact, the tone of the language
suggests a retrenchment from Polaroid II because it does not articulate
that there are, in fact, any circumstances that trigger a duty to update.
The court's holding reveals that six years after Polaroid II, the First Cir-
cuit was no closer to defining the requisite "special circumstances" dis-
382 IL (citing Serabian v. Amoskeag Bank Shares, Inc. 24 F.3d 357, 361 (1st Cir. 1994)).
For a discussion of how a duty to update cannot apply to historical statements, much less to
historical statements which plaintiffs do not allege are false, see supra text accompanying
notes 222, 232-34; supra note 325 and accompanying text.
383 24 F.3d 357 (1st Cir. 1994).
384 See Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1219 n.33.
385 Id (citing San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris
Cos., Inc., 75 F.3d 801, 811 (2d Cir. 1996)). The First Circuit discussed the bespeaks caution
doctrine earlier in the opinion with respect to a statement that Digital Equipment made con-
cerning the "'adequacy"' of its restructuring reserve. Id. at 1211-14. The Shaw court reversed
the district court's decision to invoke the bespeaks caution doctrine, finding that "[t]he cau-
tionary statements -. . did not provide an unambiguous warning." Il at 1214. Because the
First Circuit was unable to "conclude, as a matter of law and on [the particular] pleadings, that
the actionability of the 'reserve adequacy' statement [was] precluded by a context that be-
speaks caution," it "h[e]ld that the district court erred in concluding that the plaintiffs' allega-
tions ... fail[ed] to state a claim under [s]ections 11 and 12[a](2)." Id.
386 Id. at 1219 n.33 (quoting In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir.
1993), cert. denied sub nom. Ross v. Zvi Trading Corp. Employees' Money Purchase Pension
Plan, 511 U.S. 1017 (1994)). See supra text accompanying note 286 (discussing the state-
ments in Time Warner).
387 See supra text accompanying notes 228-29, 231.
388 Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1219 n.33.
3 8 9 Id.
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cussed in the Polaroid II dicta.390 Of the post-Polaroid II cases
discussed thus far, the Shaw decision is probably most similar to the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Hillson Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Adage,
Inc.39 1
In Glassman, the First Circuit followed its recent decision in
Shaw.392 The court focused on the nature of the statements that Com-
putervision made. It explained that the company's "statements did not
rise to the level of optimism or certainty that would make them materi-
ally misleading in the absence of disclosure of initial development
problems the product was facing. '393 In short, "Computervision's mild
statements of hope, couched in strongly cautionary language, cannot be
said to have become materially misleading. '394 Glassman combines
Time Warner's, Hillson Partners' and Shaw's refusal to find materiality
in vague projections 395 with Colby v. Hologic, Inc.'s and Hillson Part-
ners' reluctance to find materiality in projections that contain cautionary
language.396 Given the immateriality of its statements, Computervision
was under no duty to update.
Similarly, in Gross, the First Circuit maintained that a duty to up-
date would not devolve upon Summa Four because of the nature of its
public statement. The court noted that even if Summa Four's statement
that it "had received 'significant orders' carries a positive implication
about ... future success .... and so might, arguably, be the basis for a
duty to update claim, we think this statement falls in the category of
vague and loosely optimistic statements that this court has held nonac-
tionable as a matter of law. '397 As a result, the statement could not "be
the basis for a duty to update claim. '398 Like Shaw, neither Glassman
nor Gross cited Polaroid I. These failures to cite Polaroid II are inter-
esting because in Colby, the United States District Court for the District
of Massachusetts in 1993 was confronted with a similarly "vague" state-
390 See supra text accompanying note 224.
391 See supra text accompanying notes 305 (quoting the Hillson Partners court's skepti-
cism regarding the existence of the duty to update), 311 (reciting the same language from Time
Warner, explaining that vague projections do not require subsequent correction, and, therefore,
do not become materially misleading).
392 Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 636 (1st Cir. 1996).
393 Id. (citing Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1219 n.33; San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit
Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 75 F.3d 801, 811 (2d Cir. 1996); In re Time Warner
Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Ross v. Zvi Trading
Corp. Employees' Money Purchase Pension Plan, 511 U.S. 1017 (1994)).
394 Id.
395 See supra text accompanying notes 287, 311, 385-86.
396 See supra notes 275-76 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying note 314.
397 Gross v. Summa Four, Inc., 93 F.3d 987, 995 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing Glassman, 90
F.3d at 635-36; Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1217-19).
398 Id.
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ment.399 Yet that court contrasted the facts before it with those in Polar-
oid II, and stated the "general rule" of Polaroid I1.400 The First Circuit's
failure to discuss, or even cite, the Polaroid II dicta, coupled with the
tone of Shaw and Gross,401 suggest that the First Circuit itself is uncer-
tain about what circumstances, if any, will trigger a duty to update.
The three 1996 cases that this Section discussed-Shaw, Glassman,
and Gross-are at least consistent with each other. The First Circuit in
all three cases declined to impose the duty to update on defendants that
made predictions that were vague or accompanied by cautionary lan-
guage because these characteristics rendered the statements immaterial
for purposes of the securities laws. Nevertheless, the status of Polaroid
I--even within the First Circuit-remains unclear.
H. ZiV RE H_ALTHCARE COMPARE CORP. SECURITIES LITIGATION4 0 2
Much like the First Circuit's decisions in Shaw, Glassman, and
Gross cast some doubt on the relevance of Polaroid II, the Seventh Cir-
cuit's 1996 decision in HealthCare Compare initially raised questions
about the precedential value of its decision in Stransky v. Cummins En-
gine Co., Inc. Prior to HealthCare Compare, the Seventh Circuit's rejec-
tion of the duty to update projections appeared clear following
Stransky.4° 3 In Grassi v. Information Resources, Inc.,4° 4 the Seventh
Circuit reiterated its holding in Stransky that "'a company has no duty to
update forward-looking statements merely because changing circum-
stances have proven them wrong. ' ' 4°5  Similarly, in Fry v. UAL
Corp.,406 the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, citing Stransky, recognized that "the Seventh Circuit recently re-
fused to adopt the position that forward-looking statements give rise to a
duty to update when subsequent events make them no longer true." 407
However, the court in HealthCare Compare appears to have nisun-
derstood both the distinction between the duties to correct and update
that Stransky emphasized and the Stransky court's holding with respect
to the duty to update. A summary of the facts in this case is worthwhile,
for it demonstrates the court's confusion regarding the duties to correct
399 See supra text accompanying notes 273, 276.
400 See supra text accompanying notes 274-79.
401 See supra text accompanying notes 388, 397.
402 75 F.3d 276 (7th Cir. 1996).
403 See supra Part IV.E (discussing Stransky).
404 63 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 1995).
405 Id. at 599 (quoting Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1333 n.9 (7th
Cir. 1995)).
406 895 F. Supp. 1018, 1052 (N.D. I1. 1995), aff'd, 84 F.3d 936 (7th Cir.), reh'g and
suggestion for reh'g en banc denied (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 447 (1996).
407 Id. at 1052.
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and update. In this case, HealthCare made forward-looking statements
on February 2 and 9, 1993, expressing the company's comfort with ana-
lysts' earnings estimates.4° 8 The chief financial officer of HealthCare
subsequently included sales and revenue estimates in an internal memo-
randum dated February 24.409 On March 30, HealthCare announced in a
press release that it was "'uncomfortable"' with some of the revenue and
earnings estimates that had been within the range of estimates with
which it had expressed comfort in February. 410 The plaintiffs alleged
that HealthCare knew before it issued its March 30 press release that the
analysts' earnings estimates with which it had expressed comfort in Feb-
ruary were unrealistically high.411 According to the plaintiffs, the Febru-
ary 24 internal memorandum, which "reported a revised revenue
forecast," evidenced that HealthCare possessed knowledge that it would
not meet the analysts' earnings predictions. 412 The plaintiffs brought a
securities fraud action against HealthCare, alleging that they suffered
from fraud when HealthCare's common stock price fell by more than
thirty percent after it issued its press release on March 30.413
The plaintiffs attempted to show that HealthCare's February state-
ments "lacked a reasonable basis. ' 414 The court concluded that the
plaintiffs failed to plead with sufficient specificity, and therefore, dis-
missed this claim.415 However, the Seventh Circuit recognized another
avenue by which plaintiffs could state a securities fraud claim. Accord-
ing to the HealthCare Compare court, the plaintiffs could show "that a
duty arose prior to the March 30 press release to correct the early Febru-
ary comfort statements-a duty the neglect of which amounts to
fraud. '416 The plaintiffs claimed that HealthCare was under a duty to
correct its February statements after the "generat[ion of] the February 24
memorandum. ' 41 7 In short, the "plaintiffs claim that the company's fail-
ure to correct [the statements before the March 30 press release was]
actionable as securities fraud. 418
There are two problems with the court's statement of the law. First,
the court clearly misunderstood or ignored the Stransky explanation of
the difference between the duties to correct and update. In Stransky, the
Seventh Circuit emphasized that the duty to correct applies to historical
408 See HealthCare Compare, 75 F.3d at 278.
409 See id.
410 See id.
411 See id. at 279.
412 Id.
413 See id. at 278-79.
414 Id. at 281.
415 See id. at 280.
416 Id. at 281.
417 Id. at 282.
418 Id.
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statements that were initially inaccurate; whereas, the duty to update,
which it did not recognize, attaches to forward-looking statements that
become inaccurate. 419 One can consider HealthCare's February state-
ments to be projections, for they have the same effect on shareholders,
other investors, and securities professionals. 420 These statements were
future-oriented in that they expressed comfort with analysts' projections.
In fact, the court expressly identified the statements as "forward-look-
ing."42' Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged in their duty to correct claim
that the duty arose after the preparation of the internal memorandum. 422
This allegation suggests the plaintiffs were arguing in their duty to cor-
rect claim that the February statements became untrue.423 As discussed
earlier, the court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the
"February comfort statements lacked a reasonable basis."424 Therefore,
taken together, the February statements were forward-looking statements
that became inaccurate. 42 Under Stransky (and Polaroid I), the duty to
update-not the duty to correct-applies to such statements. 426 The
Seventh Circuit in HealthCare Compare thus, like the Fifth Circuit in
Rubinstein v. Collins,427 confused the two duties.
The second problem with the court's statement of the law is that it is
inconsistent with the holding of Stransky. The previous paragraph dis-
cussed how, under Stransky, the duty to correct cannot apply to the Feb-
ruary statements in HealthCare Compare. With respect to the duty to
update, the Stransky court refused to recognize a duty to update predic-
tions.428 As suggested above, the statements in HealthCare Compare
can be considered projections that became inaccurate.429 Thus, Stransky
is in point.430 Therefore, even if, for the purposes of clarity, we
recharacterize the plaintiffs' claim in HealthCare Compare as a duty to
update claim, the plaintiffs still cannot state a claim under Stransky be-
cause the court in that case did not recognize a duty to update projec-
419 See supra text accompanying notes 324-25.
420 For a discussion of the significance of projections, see supra note 351 and accompany-
ing text.
421 HealthCare Compare, 75 F.3d at 278.
422 See supra text accompanying note 417.
423 But cf. HealthCare Compare, 75 F.3d at 282 (noting that the "plaintiffs allege that the
circumstances which made the comfort statements false... arose prior to the statements-
even if only realized by HealthCare on February 24"). For a discussion of how the court tried
to distinguish HealthCare Compare from Stransky on this ground, see infra note 434.
424 See supra text accompanying notes 414-15.
425 The court strangely did not reach this conclusion. See supra note 423; infra note 434.
426 See supra text accompanying notes 324-25.
427 See supra Part IV.C.
428 See supra text accompanying notes 327-29, 336.
429 See supra text accompanying notes 420-25.
430 But see infra note 434 (explaining that the HealthCare Compare court contended that
"[r]eliance on Stransky is somewhat misplaced").
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tions. The Stransky court held that "a projection can lead to liability
under Rule lOb-5 only if it was not made in good faith or was made
without a reasonable basis." 431 Therefore, Stransky dictates that the
plaintiffs' "lack of a reasonable basis claim" 432 should have been the
only ground on which they could base a securities fraud claim. The
HealthCare Compare court's statement of the law thus was entirely ir-
reconcilable with Stransky.
The HealthCare Compare court's attempt to explain the Stransky
decision only further obfuscated its analysis. The court stated that in
Stransky, the Seventh Circuit "specifically declined to adopt a bright-line
rule that a duty to correct exists when a company makes a forward-look-
ing statement that becomes untrue because of subsequent events." 433
The HealthCare Compare court explained that in Stransky, "we declined
to find a duty to correct based on the rationale that 'just as a statement
true when made does not become fraudulent because things unexpectedly
go wrong, so a statement materially false when made does not become
acceptable because it happens to come true.' "434 This interpretation of
Stransky is flawed. Once again, the Stransky court refused to adopt "a
bright-line rule," as the HealthCare Compare court described it, regard-
ing the duty to update projections that become inaccurate in light of sub-
sequent events-not with respect to the duty to correct.435 Immediately
after quoting the Pommer v. Medtest Corp.436 language-which the
HealthCare Compare court cited as the "rationale" in Stransky for refus-
ing to "find a duty to correct"437-the Stransky court, by contrast, ex-
plained that "[t]hese considerations give us serious pause in imposing a
duty to update."'4 38
The court concluded its discussion of Stransky with the following
statement: "[W]e decline to hold that Stransky adopted a bright-line rule
that no duty to correct exists in any case." 439 A proper understanding of
431 Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir. 1995).
432 HealthCare Compare, 75 F.3d at 281.
433 Id. at 282.
434 Id. (quoting Stransky 51 F.3d at 1332 (quoting Pommer v. Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d
620, 623 (7th Cir. 1992))). Stating that "[rieliance on Stransky is somewhat misplaced," the
court ineffectively tried to use this language from Pommer to distinguish the facts in Health-
Care Compare from those in Stransky. Id. The court argued that HealthCare Compare "is not
a case where things unexpectedly went wrong; rather, plaintiffs allege that the circumstances
which made the comfort statements false ... arose prior to the statements-even if only
realized by HealthCare on February 24." Id. For a response to this attempt to distinguish the
cases, see supra text accompanying notes 420-25, 428-30.
435 See supra text accompanying notes 326, 336-37.
436 961 F.2d 620 (7th Cir. 1992).
437 HealthCare Compare, 75 F.3d at 282 (emphasis added); see also supra text accompa-
nying note 434 (quoting the same language from Pommer).
438 Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1332 (emphasis added).
439 HealthCare Compare, 75 F.3d at 282.
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the Stransky decision should lead one to realize that this statement does
not advance the law in any way for two reasons. First, the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Stransky refused to recognize a duty to update. The Stransky
court recognized the duty to correct initially inaccurate, historical state-
ments.440 Second, even if the aforementioned statement read "duty to
update" instead of "duty to correct," it would still not advance the law
beyond Stransky. The Stransky court expressly stated that the decision
did not represent a per se rejection of the duty to update in all cases. The
Stransky court rejected only the duty to update projections. 441 For exam-
ple, it did not rule out the possibility that a company may have a duty to
update "statements of intent to take a particular action." 442 As the fore-
going discussion should reveal, the court in HealthCare Compare obvi-
ously misunderstood the Stransly decision.
After "declin[ing] to hold that Stransky adopted a bright-line rule
that no duty to correct exists in any case," the HealthCare Compare
court applied its unique understanding of the law to the facts. 443 The
court explained: "Rather, we are persuaded that plaintiffs can only show
that a duty to correct arose by alleging facts sufficient to demonstrate that
the internal memorandum was certain and reliable, not merely a tentative
estimate."'444 "[O]therwise," the court continued, "it was not unreasona-
ble for HealthCare to wait until March 30 to make a public announce-
ment."445 The court explained that in prior cases, the Seventh Circuit
had held that companies were not required to disclose all projections-
especially tentative forecasts.446 Therefore, the HealthCare Compare
court recognized, and was perhaps willing to impose, a duty to update
(which it misidentified as a duty to correct) on HealthCare, to the extent
that the plaintiffs proved that HealthCare definitively knew at least as of
the time it prepared the internal memorandum that it would not meet the
analysts' estimates. However, the court held that the "[p]laintiffs have
not met their burden to show that the internal memorandum did not
merely contain tentative projections subject to revision." 447
The HealthCare Compare court, which misconstrued Stransly, thus
recognized the substance of the duty to update, but misidentified it as the
duty to correct, much like the Fifth Circuit did in Rubinstein,448 and then
declined to impose it under the facts that the plaintiffs alleged. While the
440 See supra text accompanying notes 326, 333.
441 See supra text accompanying note 336.
442 Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1332 n.4.
443 HealthCare Compare, 75 F.3d at 282.
444 Id.
445 Id.
446 See id. at 283.
447 Id.
448 See supra Part IV.C.
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Seventh Circuit and courts within the Seventh Circuit have cited Stransky
in numerous decisions,449 they have not cited the two-to-one HealthCare
Compare decision in support of either a duty to correct or a duty to up-
date. As a result, HealthCare Compare's misunderstanding of Stransky
should probably be viewed as anomalous in light of the Seventh Circuit's
decisions preceding and, as the next Section demonstrates, following the
case.
I. E SENSTADT V. CENTEL CoRp.
4 5 0
In Eisenstadt, the Seventh Circuit buttressed its decision in Stran-
sky. Although the court addressed the duty to update only in dicta,45' the
case is important for two reasons. 'First, it represents the boldest judicial
rejection of a duty to update. Second, Eisenstadt was the first major case
discussing the duty to update to cite the PSLRA in support of its deci-
sion.452 Centel announced on January 23, 1992 its plan to hold an auc-
tion at which bidders could bid to purchase the entire company or a
smaller part of the company.453 On March 5, GTE stated that it would
not bid for Centel at the auction.45 4 Three weeks later, Pacific Telesis, a
Baby Bell company that had expressed interest in bidding for a certain
"major asset" of Centel, announced that it would not participate in the
auction.455 Other large potential bidders similarly reported that they
would not partake in the auction.45 6 Despite these indications that
the auction might prove unsuccessful, Centel declared to the public
that "'the bidding process continues to go very well' and 'very
smoothly.' ,,457 On April 13, Centel stated that a proposed auction to sell
the company had generated considerable interest; however, the auction,
which took place on April 16, was a failure-only seven companies bid
for Centel and none of the bids were to purchase the entire company.458
Stockholders brought a section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claim against
Centel for allegedly fraudulent representations regarding its auction.45 9
The Seventh Circuit held that Centel's representations were not actiona-
449 See supra note 342 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 403-07;
infra note 466 and accompanying text.
450 113 F.3d 738 (7th Cir.), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied (7th Cir.
1997).
451 See id. at 746.
452 Id. at 744, 746.
453 See id.
454 See id. at 741.
455 Id.
456 See id.
457 Id.
458 See id. at 741-42.
459 See id. at 740.
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ble under Rule lOb-5; they were, at worst, "[m]ere sales puffery." 460 The
court maintained that the statements were not "so discordant with reality
that they would induce a reasonable investor to buy the stock at a higher
price than it was worth ex ante."461 Assessing the materiality of the
statements, the Eisenstadt court explained that "[i]t would be unreasona-
ble for investors to attach significance to general expressions of satisfac-
tion with the progress of the seller's efforts to sell."462 These statements
were thus immaterial. On the other hand, the court clarified that Centel's
representation that the auction was "going smoothly would have been
materially deceptive," if, for example, Centel neglected to disclose "a
disaster," such as if lienors refused to consent to a sale of Centel's en-
cumbered assets.463
The Seventh Circuit's focus on the immateriality of Centel's state-
ments to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim is consistent with how courts have
disposed of many of the securities antifraud claims discussed in the pre-
ceding Sections.464 Eisenstadt is different from most of these cases be-
cause, as the court emphatically noted, Centel did not make any
predictions.465
Nonetheless, the court proceeded to explain that "[e]ven if it had
made a public prediction. . ., it would have had no legal duty, in this
circuit anyway and perhaps in no circuit after the [PSLRA], to make a
public revision of the prediction when it became clear" that the predic-
tion had become inaccurate. 466 In spite of the court's usage of the phrase
"duty to correct," 4 67 it is clear that the Seventh Circuit in Eisenstadt was
reaffirming its decision in Stransky to reject the duty to update projec-
tions.468 As discussed above, the PSLRA certainly does not expressly
reject the duty to update.469 In fact, one could just as easily argue that
the explicit language of the PSLRA preserves the judge-created duty to
update in jurisdictions, other than the Seventh Circuit, that have recog-
nized the duty. The Seventh Circuit's suggestion that the PSLRA has
460 Il at 746 (citing, inter alia, Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1217-18 (lst
Cir. 1996)).
461 Id.
462 Id. at 745.
463 Id.
464 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 286 (discussing In re Time Warner Inc. Se-
curities Litigation), 311 (discussing Hillson Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Adage, Inc.).
465 Eisenstadt, 113 F.3d at 746.
466 Id. (citing Grassi v. Information Resources, Inc., 63 F.3d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 1995);
Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1331-32 (7th Cir. 1995)); see also id. at
744 (noting that "it is true... that in this circuit, and maybe now in all circuits (as a result of
[the PSLRA]), there is no duty to correct a prediction falsified by subsequent events").
467 Id. at 744; see supra note 466.
468 See infra text accompanying note 466 (citing Stransky in support of its repudiation of
the duty to update); see also supra Part IV.E (discussing Stransky).
469 See supra Part IV.F.2.
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abolished the duty to update is an excessively broad interpretation of the
express language in the statute. One could also argue that the legislative
intent underlying the PSLRA runs contrary to a duty to update.470 How-
ever, the court in Eisenstadt did not address legislative intent; it simply
concluded that the PSLRA may have signalled the death of the duty to
update.
The court's dicta in Eisenstadt did not elaborate on the Stransky
court's qualification regarding the undetermined status of the duty to up-
date forward-looking statements that were neither predictions nor projec-
tions, such as "statements of intent to take a certain action.1471 Although
the tone of the court's opinion suggests that the Seventh Circuit has com-
pletely rejected the duty to update,472 this issue of law that Stransky
raised remains unresolved at the circuit court level.473
J. ZN RE BURLINGTON COAT FACTORY SECURITIES LITIGATION
4 7 4
As the discussion of the cases above suggests, the duty to update
and, in particular, the Polaroid II dicta appeared to be waning since the
en banc decision and, especially, after the PSLRA. However, the Third
Circuit's June 1997 decision in Burlington Coat Factory revitalized the
significance of the Polaroid II dicta. The court devoted considerable en-
ergy to distinguishing the duty to correct from the duty to update and to
analyzing both duties.
1. Duty to Correct Claim
In Burlington Coat Factory, the plaintiffs brought "a 'duty to cor-
rect' claim" against Burlington Coat Factory for failing to correct an
earnings projection that had become inaccurate. 475 The court recognized
that the plaintiffs were, in reality, "asserting both a duty to correct and a
duty to update" claim.476 The court quoted the Stransky v. Cummins En-
gine Co., Inc. construction of the duty to correct,4 7 7 and cited Polaroid II
470 See supra text accompanying note 367.
471 See supra text accompanying notes 336-37.
472 See supra note 466 and accompanying text.
473 However, in Fry v. UAL Corp., the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois concluded that a company should not be subject to a duty to update a statement
of intent. Fry v. UAL Corp., 895 F. Supp. 1018, 1053 (N.D. Ill. 1995), aff'd, 84 F.3d 936 (7th
Cir.), reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 447
(1996). Rather, "a statement of intent-like a projection or prediction-will result in liability
only if the plaintiff can establish that it was not made in good faith or upon a reasonable basis."
Id.
474 114 F.3d 1410 (3d Cir. 1997).
475 Id. at 1430.
476 Id.
477 See supra text accompanying note 324.
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as additional support for a recognition of the duty to update.478 As dis-
cussed above, Stransky explained that the duty to correct applies only to
historical statements; whereas, the duty to update applies to future-ori-
ented statements. 479 However, the Third Circuit suggested in dictum that
the Stransky conception of the duty was somewhat incomplete because
the duty "can also apply to a certain set of forward-looking state-
ments. '480 The court then presented a fact pattern which it thought sup-
ported this conclusion. 481 The upshot of the court's reasoning is that
when a public company makes a forecast, "there is an implicit represen-
tation ... that errors [regarding the original data that were reasonably
made, and discovered as a result of subsequent events] will be cor-
rected," assuming "the correction ... was material to the forecast that
was disclosed earlier." 482 The court emphasized that this situation trig-
gers a duty to correct because "the error, albeit an honest one, was one
that had to do with information available at the time the forecast was
made and that the error in the information was subsequently
discovered. '48
3
Despite this lengthy discussion of the duty to correct in dictum, the
court dismissed the duty to correct claim because the plaintiffs did not
allege with specificity how the forecast was erroneous when made.484
Additionally, the plaintiffs neglected to "identif[y] the specific times at
which these errors were discovered, so as to allow correction and trigger
defendants' alleged duty.1485 Moreover, the court correctly decided that
the "claim [was] better characterized as a 'duty to update' claim. 486
The court's expansion of the duty to correct to include "a certain set
of forward-looking statements" 487 constitutes a departure from the prior
case law, which has maintained that the duty only applies to historical
statements.488 The duty to correct, as theretofore conceived, is not trig-
gered when a company subsequently discovers that a forecast was origi-
nally inaccurate.48 9 The Third Circuit attempted to address this problem
of explaining how the duty to correct could apply to certain forward-
looking statements by focusing in dictum on whether "information avail-
478 Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1430-31.
479 See supra notes 324-25 and accompanying text.
480 Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1431.
481 See id.
482 Id.
483 Id.
484 See id.
485 Id.
486 Id.
487 Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1431.
488 See supra text accompanying note 324.
489 The duty to update, which applies to forecasts that have become materially inaccurate
or misleading, would similarly not apply to an initially inaccurate forecast.
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able at the time the [original statement] was made" would have rendered
the statement erroneous. 490 Prior to Burlington Coat Factory, most
courts were not concerned with whether a company could or should have
known that a disclosure was erroneous in light of information available
when it made the statement.49' Rather, they have recognized a com-
pany's duty to correct a statement when that statement itself was materi-
ally inaccurate or misleading when made.492
But for an occasional misidentification of a duty to update case as a
duty to correct case or vice versa, the recent duty to correct case law had
been fairly consistent since Polaroid II. In light of the dictum in Bur-
lington Coat Factory, the precise status of the duty to correct is now
somewhat unclear-at least in the Third Circuit.
2. Duty to Update Claim
Citing Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc. and Polaroid II, the Third Cir-
cuit explained the duty to update, which it understood was more relevant
to the case than the duty to correct.493 According to the Burlington Coat
Factory court, "[t]he duty to update . . . concerns statements that,
although reasonable at the time made, become misleading when viewed
in the context of subsequent events. '494 The court reiterated Polaroid
!!'s "special circumstances" requirement,495 and acknowledged that
"although we have generally recognized that a duty to update might exist
490 Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1431.
491 This analysis that the Third Circuit explored in dictum most resembles the Seventh
Circuit's approach in Stransky and the language of the safe harbor that the SEC adopted in
Rules 175 and 3b-6. As discussed above in Part IV.E, the Stransky court held that "a projec-
tion can lead to liability under Rule lOb-5 only if it was not made in good faith or was made
without a reasonable basis." Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1333 (7th
Cir. 1995). In a footnote, the Stransky court noted that in an earlier case, the Seventh Circuit
"[iln dicta... stated that predictions that don't pan out can lead to Rule lOb-5 liability only if
the prediction was unreasonable in light of information available at the time the statement was
made." Id. at 1333 n.8 (emphasis added) (citing Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d
1121, 1132 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1073 (1994)). Therefore, the court in Stran-
sky suggested that information available when a company has made a statement may affect a
determination of whether the projection was "not made in good faith or was made without a
reasonable basis," and therefore, whether a company is subject to Rule lOb-5 liability. Id. at
1333.
Similarly, the safe harbor for forward-looking statements in Rules 175 and 3b-6 contains
language that is analogous to the Burlington Coat Factory's dictum. It provides that "an [is-
suer's forward-looking] statement within the coverage of [Rules 175(b) or 3b-6(b)] ... shall be
deemed not to be a fraudulent statement ... unless it is shown that such statement was made or
reaffirmed without a reasonable basis or was disclosed other than in good faith." 17 C.F.R.
§§ 230.175(a), 240.2b-6(a) (1997); see supra text accompanying notes 131-35.
492 See supra Part II.A; supra text accompanying notes 219, 324.
493 Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1431.
494 Id. (citing Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 758 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1215 (1985); Polaroid 11, 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc)).
495 Id. at 1431-32; see supra text accompanying note 224.
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under certain circumstances, we have not clarified when such circum-
stances might exist."496 Burlington Coat Factory presented a new issue
for the Third Circuit, which had not previously considered whether a
duty to update attaches to "ordinary, run-of-the-mill forecasts. 497
The plaintiffs claimed that Burlington Coat Factory breached its
duty to update when the company failed to disclose information it had
acquired after making an earnings projection. 498 According to the plain-
tiffs, such information materially changed the projection.499 The court
focused on the nature of the federal securities laws to determine whether
a solitary earnings forecast triggered a duty to update that forecast on an
ongoing basis in light of subsequently acquired, material information that
would materially affect the original forecast.500 The basis for this duty,
according to the court, must "be that the projection contained an implicit
factual representation that remained 'alive' in the minds of investors as a
continuing representation." 50 1
Emphasizing two "well settled ... principle[s]" under the federal
securities laws, the court held that a regular earnings projection lacks "an
implicit representation on the part of the company that it will update the
investing public with all material information that relates to the fore-
cast."50 2 First, the court reiterated that a company is not required to dis-
close material information absent a duty to disclose.50 3 Second, the court
stated that a company's accurate statement of prior success does not nec-
essarily imply a continuation of success. 504 In addition, the Third Cir-
cuit, conspicuously omitting discussion of the PSLRA, explained that the
imposition of a duty to update standard earnings forecasts would conflict
with the SEC's current efforts to facilitate forward-looking voluntary dis-
closure from companies. 50 5 To the extent that a duty to update projec-
tions discourages companies from making earnings projections, investors
would suffer, for "it is these specific earnings projections that are the
496 Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1431-32 (citing In re Phillips Petroleum See.
Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1245 (3d Cir. 1989); Polaroid 11, 910 F.2d at 17)). The court returned to
a discussion of the "special circumstances" later in the opinion. See infra text accompanying
notes 520-22.
497 Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1432.
498 See id.
499 See id.
500 See id. at 1432-33.
501 Id. at 1432.
502 Id. at 1432-33.
503 See id. at 1432 (citing In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir.
1993), cert. denied sub nom. Ross v. ZVI Trading Corp. Employees' Money Purchase Pension
Plan, 511 U.S. 1017 (1994)).
504 See id (citing, inter alia, Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1202 (1st Cir.
1996); Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 289 (4th Cir. 1993)).
505 Id. at 1432-33 (citing Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1333 (7th
Cir. 1995); Raab, 4 F.3d at 290).
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most useful to investors in deciding whether to invest in a firm's securi-
ties."'50 6 Imposing burdensome disclosure obligations on companies ap-
peared particularly inappropriate to the Burlington Coat Factory court
given that the plaintiffs' claim, as recast by the court, meant that "the
disclosure of a single specific forecast produced a continuous duty to
update the public with either forecasts or hard information that would in
anyway change a reasonable investor's perception of the originally fore-
casted range." 507 In light of the foregoing policy arguments, the court
"decline[d] to hold that the disclosure of a single, ordinary earnings fore-
cast can produce such an expansive set of disclosure obligations.1 508
The court held that "the voluntary disclosure of an ordinary earnings
forecast d[id] not trigger any duty to update."50 9
The Third Circuit's holding that companies are not under a duty to
update "an ordinary earnings forecast" reaches the same result as the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Stransky, which rejected the application of
a duty to update projections.5 10 The court in Burlington Coat Factory
used language to describe forecasts that was nearly identical to that
which the Seventh Circuit used in Stransky regarding projections: "We
conclude that ordinary, run-of-the-mill forecasts contain no more than
the implicit representation that the forecasts were made reasonably and in
good faith.,511 Much like the Stransky holding was limited to projec-
tions,512 the duty to update holding in Burlington Coat Factory only ap-
plied to standard forecasts.
The court in Burlington Coat Factory emphasized the importance of
understanding that its holding was limited. It distinguished the facts in
the case from those in Greenfield and In re Phillips Petroleum Securities
Litigation.513 In both of these cases, the Third Circuit "recognized that a
duty to update might exist. '514 According to the Burlington Coat Fac-
tory court, Greenfield and Phillips Petroleum both addressed statements
made in the context of "takeover attempts," therefore, "the initial disclo-
sures that were argued to have triggered the duty to update involved in-
506 Id. at 1433.
507 Id. at 1432.
508 Id.
509 Id. at 1433.
510 See supra text accompanying notes 326, 336.
511 Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1433 (citing Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co.,
Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir. 1995)). In Stransky, the court explained that "a projection
can lead to liability under Rule lob-5 only if it was not made in good faith or was made
without a reasonable basis." Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1333.
512 See supra text accompanying notes 336-37.
513 See Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1433-34; see supra text accompanying notes
143-46 (discussing Greenfield), 156-59 (discussing Phillips Petroleum).
514 Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1433; see supra text accompanying notes 150
(discussing Greenfield), 162-63 (discussing Phillips Petroleum).
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formation about events that could fundamentally change the natures of
the companies involved.1515 On the other hand, the statement at issue in
Burlington Coat Factory was only an earnings forecast. 516 The court
explained that "finding a duty to update a disclosure of a takeover threat
is a far cry from finding a duty to update a[ ] simple earnings forecast,
which, if anything, contains a clear implication that circumstances under-
lying it are likely to change. '517
To the extent that there is such a "clear implication that circum-
stances underlying [a forecast] are likely to change," 518 the statement is
likely to be immaterial, and not one on which an investor could be ex-
pected to reasonably rely. Polaroid II's dicta stated that in "special cir-
cumstances," a company may have a duty to update a statement that,
among other things, is reasonable for the parties to rely upon, and that
becomes materially misleading.519 Therefore, given that the Burlington
Coat Factory court implicitly considered this reliance element, presuma-
bly concluded that the statement was immaterial, and that it distinguished
the facts of the case from those in Greenfield and Phillips Petroleum to
suggest that the required "special circumstances" were lacking, the hold-
ing in Burlington Coat Factory regarding the duty to update forecasts
appears not to disrupt the existing duty to update case law that Green-
field, Phillips Petroleum, and Polaroid II established.
In fact, the court's consideration of the duty to update concluded
with some guidance in dicta regarding what Polaroid Irs "special cir-
cumstances" requirement for a duty to update might entail.5 20 This dis-
cussion goes far beyond Stransky because it appears to provide support
for a duty to update. The court opined that "[w]here the initial disclosure
relates to the announcement of a fundamental change in the course the
company is likely to take, there may be room to read in an implicit repre-
sentation by the company that it will update the public.., of any radical
change in the company's plans. ' 521 "[N]ews that [a] merger is no longer
likely to take place" is an example of such a fundamental change.5 22 In a
footnote, the Third Circuit elaborated on its position:
We emphasize that we are not saying that once a funda-
mental change is announced the company faces a duty
515 Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1433 (citing Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742
F.2d 751, 758-59 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985); In re Phillips Petroleum
Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1239, 1245 (3d Cir. 1989)).
516 Id.
517 Id. at 1434.
518 Id.
519 See supra text accompanying note 222.
520 Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1433-34.
521 Id. (citing In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1246 (3d Cir. 1989)).
522 Id. at 1434 (citing Phillips Petroleum, 881 F.2d at 1246).
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continuously to update the public with all material infor-
mation relating to that change. Instead, we think that the
duty to update, to the extent it might exist, would be a
narrow one to update the public as to extreme changes in
the company's originally expressed expectation of an
event such as a takeover, merger, or liquidation. But cf
Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 745 (7th Cir.
1997) (suggesting that even such a narrow duty might
not exist). 523
On the one hand, this language further clarifies when a company
may have a duty to update prior disclosure. It appears to build on the
qualifying language in Stransky which explained that the 7th Circuit "ex-
press[ed] no opinion on whether the outcome would be the same if a
plaintiff contested statements of intent to take a certain action." 524 How-
ever, on the other hand, the court's suggestion that there may not exist a
duty to update at all, together with its citation of Eisenstadt, is troubling
because it undercuts much of the court's prior discussion concerning the
duty. As discussed above, much of the court's treatment of the duty to
update suggests that the Third Circuit recognized the duty; it merely de-
clined to impose on Burlington Coat Factory a duty to update a standard
earnings forecast. 525 This footnote leaves many questions unanswered,
including whether there even exists a duty to update. Unfortunately, this
footnote represented the end of the Third Circuit's theretofore cogent
discussion of the duty.
Subsequent decisions within or by the Third Circuit have not clari-
fied the dicta in Burlington Coat Factory.526 A Pennsylvania district
court case, Wallace v. Systems & Computer Technology Corp.,527 ad-
dressed the duty to update in September 1997.528 The court followed the
Third Circuit's dicta in Burlington Coat Factory that the duty to update
may exist "[u]nder certain circumstances. '529 The court discussed the
holding of Burlington Coat Factory:
[A]n ordinary, run-of-the mill earnings projection con-
tains no more than the implicit representation that the
forecasts were made reasonably and in good faith and
523 Id. at 1434 n.20 (second emphasis added).
524 Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1332 n.4 (7th Cir. 1995); see
also supra notes 340-42 and accompanying text (discussing this language).
525 See supra text accompanying note 509.
526 See infra text accompanying notes 527-31; infra Part IV.K.
527 No. CIV.A. 95-CV-6303, 1997 WL 602808 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 1997).
528 Id. at *13, *18 n.43.
529 Id. at *13 (citing Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 758 (3d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985); In re Phillips Petroleum See. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1245 (3d
Cir. 1989)).
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disclosure of a specific earnings forecast does not con-
tain the implication that the forecast will continue to
hold good even as circumstances change. They do not
contain an implicit representation that the company will
update the investing public with all material information
that relates to the forecast.5 30
Following this reasoning, the court held in Wallace that the defend-
ant company "had no duty to update [an] earnings projection in light of
events that occurred or became known to [the company] subsequent to
the making of that projection."'531 In recognizing that a company may
have a duty to update "[u]nder certain circumstances" while following
only the narrow holding of Burlington Coat Factory, as opposed to the
dicta, the Wallace court properly interpreted the Third Circuit's opinion.
Despite Wallace, the Third Circuit's decision in Weiner v. Quaker Oats
Co., discussed below, reveals that the dicta in Burlington Coat Factory
will undoubtedly, with respect to both the duties to correct and update,
usher in further confusion to an area of law that desperately requires
clarification.
K. WEI ER V. 2UAKER OATS Co.532
In contrast to Wallace, the Third Circuit decided this duty to update
case in November 1997 without citing its June 1997 decision in Burling-
ton Coat Factory as support.533 The plaintiffs alleged that Quaker made
statements prior to a merger that materially "omitted mention of a
planned increase in the total debt-to-total capitalization ratio guide-
line."534 Prior to applying the law to the facts of the case, the court set
forth the law in the Third Circuit regarding nondisclosure claims under
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 535 The court cited In re Phillips Petro-
leum Securities Litigation, and maintained that "[iun general, [s]ection
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 do not impose a duty on defendants to correct prior
530 l at *18 n.43 (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory See. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1431
(3d Cir. 1997)).
531 Id.
532 129 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 1997).
533 Although the Weiner court did not mention Burlington Coat Factory to support its
holding regarding the duty to update claim relating to Quaker's statements about its "total
debt-to-total capitalization guideline ratio," id. at 315-18, it cited the case in its analysis of the
plaintiffs' claim regarding alleged, materially misleading earnings growth projections. The
court cited Burlington Coat Factory in its discussion of materiality, id& at 320, and in its
explanation of the requirement that a statement must "remain 'alive"' to be actionable in a
securities fraud claim, id. at 321. The court dismissed the claim regarding the projections
because a subsequent disclosure "cured" the projection of its "misleading effect," thus render-
ing it immaterial. Id.
534 See id. at 316.
535 See id. at 315-16.
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statements-particularly statements of intent-so long as those state-
ments were true when made. '536 Standing alone, it is unclear whether
the court was merely explaining in this sentence the narrow province
reserved for the duty to correct, or if it was rejecting-or at least limit-
ing-the duty to update, but couching it in duty to correct language.
However, the Third Circuit's subsequent analysis of the law reveals
that the court was neither concerned with the duty to correct nor sought
to reject the duty to update. Rather, despite its use of duty to correct
language, the court recognized the duty to update and, in effect, distin-
guished it from the "duty to correct prior statements... [that] were true
when made. ' 537 Quoting the duty to correct language in Phillips Petro-
leum that actually represented a recognition of a duty to update,538 the
court noted that "'[t]here can be no doubt that a duty exists to correct
prior statements, if the prior statements were true when made but mis-
leading if left unrevised.' 539 The court devoted considerable attention
to explaining the requirement that the statement must be material. 540 Af-
ter finding that the statements were material, the court held that "a rea-
sonable factfinder could determine that Quaker's statements ... would
have been material to a reasonable investor, and hence that Quaker had a
duty to update such statements when they became unreliable."'54t Unlike
the prior cases, some of which only went so far as to recognize a duty to
update, and often only in dicta, the Weiner court held that a reasonable
factfinder could find that Quaker had a duty to update its prior
statements.
Because the claim in Weiner regarding Quaker's failure to disclose
its intention to increase the total debt-to-total capitalization ratio guide-
line-unlike the claim in Wallace542-did not involve a projection, Bur-
lington Coat Factory may not have been in point. Perhaps the Third
Circuit has adopted a case-by-case approach whereby it focuses primar-
ily on the nature of the original statement. For example, it justified in
Burlington Coat Factory its recognition of the duty to update in Green-
field and Phillips Petroleum on the ground that the statements that the
defendants made in those cases were in connection with "takeover at-
tempts," thereby "involv[ing] information about events that could funda-
536 Id. at 316 (citing In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1245 (3dCir.
1989)). The court did not revisit its dicta in Burlington Coat Factory regarding how the duty
to correct might attach to forward-looking statements. See supra notes 480-92 and accompa-
nying text.
537 Weiner, 129 F.3d at 316.
538 See supra text accompanying note 162.
539 Weiner, 129 F.3d at 316 (alteration in original) (quoting Phillips Petroleum, 881 F.2d
at 1245).
540 See id. at 316-18.
541 Id. at 318.
542 See supra text accompanying note 531.
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mentally change the natures of the companies involved. '543 In
Burlington Coat Factory and Wallace, the courts rejected imposition of a
duty to update standard earnings projections. 544 In Weiner, Quaker's
material omission was in the context of a merger 5 45 that is, like the cir-
cumstances surrounding the statements in Greenfield and Phillips Petro-
leum, in the context of "events that could fundamentally change the
natures of the companies involved. '546 The Third Circuit presumably
viewed the types of statements in Greenfield, Phillips Petroleum, and
Weiner, in contrast to those in Burlington Coat Factory and Wallace, as
material statements on which a reasonable investor might rely.
Nevertheless, the Weiner court's omission of any discussion of the
dicta regarding either the duty to correct or the duty to update in Burling-
ton Coat Factory, which it decided, only five months before Weiner, is
surprising. This omission raises questions about the precedential value
of Burlington Coat Factory-even within the Third Circuit-and, in par-
ticular, about the precise status of the duty to update. Weiner would have
been an ideal case for the Supreme Court to hear, and to decide whether
the duty to update exists and, if so, to establish the scope of the duty. In
light of the circuit split and the uncertainty surrounding the language in
the PSLRA, the legal issue is certainly ripe.
V. RESTRICTING THE SCOPE OF THE DUTY TO UPDATE
A. JUSTIFICATION
The cases decided after Polaroid II clearly suggest that there is no
uniform understanding of the duty to update. The PSLRA similarly did
not introduce consistency. Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp., Glassman
v. Computervision Corp., Gross v. Summa Four, Inc., In re HealthCare
Compare Corp. Securities Litigation, Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., In re
Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, Wallace v. Systems &
Computer Technology Corp., and Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co. were all
decided after the enactment of the PSLRA. With the notable exception
of -Eisenstadt,547 these other cases understandably have neither cited the
PSLRA as support for, nor against, a recognition of a duty to update. In
Burlington Coat Factory, the Third Circuit extensively discussed how a
duty to update could undermine the Commission's policy goal of encour-
aging forward-looking statements, yet the case conspicuously neglected
to mention the PSLRA in its discussion of the duty to update.548 Recent
543 In re Burlington Coat Factory See. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1433 (3d Cir. 1997).
544 See supra text accompanying notes 509, 531.
545 See supra text accompanying note 534.
546 Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1433.
547 See supra note 466 and accompanying text.
548 Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1432-33.
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commentary has proposed that until the sections of the PSLRA address-
ing the duty to update are "further clarified through judicial interpreta-
tion, it may be prudent to assume that some duty to update projections
has been assumed once they are made . . .and to factor this into the
equation when deciding whether to make public projections." 549 How-
ever, the PSLRA and post-Polaroid I case law shed more light on the
status of the duty to update than these authorities suggest.
The present legislative intent of, and SEC commitment to, promot-
ing the public policy goals of promoting efficient markets and protecting
investors through the encouragement of forward-looking statements550
will probably trump the notion of protection via a broad duty to update.
This result is especially probable given that lawyers are apparently advis-
ing their clients not to make forward-looking statements in light of po-
tential liability arising from a duty to update.55 1 However, because the
duty to update does provide the public with some protection against
fraud, courts may continue to recognize the duty barring legislative de-
cree or binding precedent. Furthermore, the Rule 175 and Rule 3b-6 safe
harbor for forward-looking statements, which the SEC adopted in 1979,
has not stopped courts from recognizing the duty to update. Neverthe-
less, the policy considerations regarding the facilitation of forward-look-
ing statements, in conjunction with courts' current reluctance to
impose-or, in some jurisdictions, refusal to recognize-the duty, sug-
gest that courts are likely to narrow the scope of the duty to update.
This narrowing of the duty to update will probably discourage some
hopeful plaintiffs from bringing duty to update claims against companies.
This should, to an extent, reduce the number of frivolous Rule lOb-5
lawsuits. However, a substantial reduction in the number of duty to up-
date claims will only occur if Congress clarifies the duty to update or the
Supreme Court hears a duty to update case and introduces uniformity to
the case law.
B. METHODS
The post-Polaroid I case law has suggested ten ways in which
courts can reduce the reach of the duty to update. 552 If courts follow
549 Cochran & McCoy, supra note 367, at 17.
550 See supra notes 350-51 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of for-
ward-looking statements).
551 See supra text accompanying notes 349, 549.
552 As mentioned earlier, a discussion of the elements that plaintiffs must prove to state a
claim for a securities fraud case under Rule lOb-5, and of the pleading requirements under the
federal securities laws and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is beyond the scope of this
Note. In light of the Note's relative silence on these issues, it is important to point out here
that courts can also limit the scope of the duty to update by narrowly construing all of the
elements of a Rule lob-5 claim; for example, by narrowly construing scienter or causation, and
THE DUTY TO UPDATE
Polaroid II, the dicta prescribes seven criteria for the activation of a
company's duty to update: A company may be under a duty to update (i)
in "special circumstances" (ii) a statement that was an initially correct,
(iii) forward-looking disclosure (iv) with a "clear meaning" (v) on which
an investor could reasonably rely (vi) when there is a "change" (vii) that
causes the original statement to become materially misleading.553 The
first way in which courts can limit the scope of the duty to update is to
require all seven of these criteria, and to narrowly construe each of them.
For example, there will be cases where the original statement can be
viewed as either an historical or a forward-looking statement. A narrow
interpretation of forward-looking statements will enable courts to dismiss
many duty to update claims. Second, courts may follow the example that
the Second Circuit set in In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation and
restrict holdings to the particular facts of each case.554 A court could
recognize or impose a duty to update on a company, and limit this hold-
ing to the unique facts of that case.
Third, following Polaroid II and Evanowski v. Bankworcester
Corp., courts can strictly interpret what information is within the scope
of the original disclosure.555 This would immunize companies from duty
to update claims predicated on subsequent events that concern matters
even remotely outside this scope. A narrow interpretation of the scope of
the original statement will also enable courts to find that there has not
been "a change," which the Polaroid II dicta requires, 556 that has ren-
dered the original statement materially misleading. If the scope of the
original disclosure is construed particularly narrowly, subsequent events
may not affect the narrowly defined original statement, or if they do, they
may only have a peripheral impact which would be insufficient to render
the statement itself materially misleading.
Courts may not require all seven of the Polaroid II elements. These
courts can narrow the scope of the duty to update by imposing restric-
tions on the original disclosure. For example, nearly all courts will re-
fuse to impose on companies a duty to update immaterial statements.557
The fourth method of limiting the duty to update is to rely on TSC Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, Weiner v. Quaker
Oats Co., and similar cases to emphasize that the original disclosure, and
by ensuring that plaintiffs plead each element with sufficient specificity. Part V.B of this Note
focuses on avenues available to courts to narrow the scope of the duty to update in and of
itself-not means by which courts can limit liability under Rule lOb-5 in general.
553 See supra text accompanying notes 224-31.
554 See supra text accompanying note 291.
555 See supra text accompanying notes 212-13; infra text accompanying notes 266-68.
556 See supra text accompanying note 230.
557 Cf. supra note 231 (quoting dicta in Hillson Partners Ltd. Partnership that other cases
can be interpreted to impose on companies a duty to update immaterial statements).
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the additional information which renders the original disclosure inaccu-
rate or misleading, must both be material. 558 A refusal to expand upon
these cases' materiality standard, and a requirement that both the initial
statement and the subsequent information must be material, will elimi-
nate many duty to update claims. Courts, for example, can apply the
bespeaks caution doctrine to dismiss claims based on forward-looking
statements that are accompanied by "meaningful" and "sufficient" cau-
tionary language on the ground that the statements are immaterial. 559
Fifth, courts can rely on Time Warner, Hillson Partners Ltd. Part-
nership v. Adage, Inc., Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp., Glassman v.
Computervision Corp., and Gross v. Summa Four, Inc. to reserve appli-
cation of the duty to update for only "the sort of definite positive projec-
tions that might later require later correction. '5 60 This approach, which
focuses on the materiality of the original statement, will filter out many
claims. For example, this requirement would insulate companies that
make general statements of opinion from potential duty to update liabil-
ity. As the Fourth Circuit has explained, "'soft,' 'puffing' statements ...
generally lack materiality because the market price of a share is not in-
flated by vague statements predicting growth."'561 Similarly, in Eisen-
stadt v. Centel Corp., the Seventh Circuit opined that "[ilt would be
unreasonable for investors to attach significance to general expressions
of satisfaction with the progess of [a] seller's efforts to sell. '562
Sixth, in contrast to the previous strategy, courts can narrow the
scope of the duty by restricting a recognition of a duty to update to for-
ward-looking statements other than predictions and projections. For ex-
ample, as the Seventh Circuit's dicta in Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co.,
Inc. hinted, courts could reserve the duty to update for situations where a
company makes material public "statements of [an] intent to take a cer-
tain action" 563 that become materially inaccurate, misleading, or incom-
plete in light of subsequent developments. Similarly, courts could follow
the dicta in In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation, imposing
the duty only in situations "[w]here the initial disclosure relates to the
558 See supra Parts I.C.1, IV.K.
559 See supra Part I.C.2; supra note 276; supra text accompanying notes 313-14, 396.
The first prong of the PSLRA safe harbor may also insulate companies from liability for
failing to update statements that either include cautionary language or are immaterial, which
have become materially inaccurate or misleading. See supra note 360 and accompanying text;
infra text accompanying note 578.
560 Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1219 n.33 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting In re
Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Ross v.
Zvi Trading Corp. Employees' Money Purchase Pension Plan, 511 U.S. 1017 (1994)).
561 Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 289 (4th Cir. 1993).
562 Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 745 (7th Cir.), reh'g and suggestion for
reh'g en banc denied (7th Cir. 1997).
563 Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1332 n.4 (7th Cir. 1995).
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announcement of a fundamental change in the course the company is
likely to take. ' 564 In particular, courts could follow the Third Circuit's
distinction in Burlington Coat Factory of the facts in that case with those
in Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc. and in In re Phillips Petroleum Securities
Litigation, and require that the statements or omissions must "involve[ ]
information about events that could fundamentally change the natures of
the companies involved," such as in the context of a takeover.5 65 The
recent holding in Weiner, in which the Third Circuit found that Quaker
may have had a duty to update statements made before a merger, may
provide further support for this restriction of the duty.5 66
The seventh method, like the prior three, focuses on the original
statement. Courts can narrowly construe the types of statements on
which a reasonable investor could rely. If a reasonable investor cannot
be expected to rely on a particular statement, the statement is not actiona-
ble in a securities fraud claim, 567 and thus cannot trigger a duty to up-
date. The Third Circuit in Burlington Coat Factory explained, for
example, that a "simple earnings forecast .... if anything, contains a
clear implication that circumstances underlying it are likely to
change. ' 568 A vague or indefinite projection may not only be immate-
rial, it may also be a statement on which an investor could not reasonably
rely. Likewise, the bespeaks caution doctrine, in addition to speaking to
the materiality of the statement, can also render reliance on a particular
statement unreasonable.5 69 Therefore, if companies include meaningful
and sufficient cautionary language in their forward-looking statements,
courts may be able to dismiss duty to update claims on the ground that
the plaintiffs' reliance on these statements was unreasonable. Carl
Schneider has argued that "[t]o the extent reasonable investors should
perceive that the information initially disclosed is subject to change, the
fact that a change has occurred should not, in and of itself, trigger an
independent Rule lOb-5 disclosure obligation under the duty to update
rubric. ' 570 Similarly, courts probably will refuse to impose on compa-
nies a duty to update statements that a third party unaffiliated with the
company made, for, in most instances, it would be unreasonable for in-
vestors to rely on these statements as if the company had made them.571
564 In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1433-34 (3d Cir. 1997).
565 Id. at 1433 (citing Greenfield v. Heublein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 758-59 (3d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1215 (1985); In re Phillips Petroleum Sec. Litig., 881 F.2d 1236, 1239,
1245 (3d Cir. 1989)).
566 See supra text accompanying notes 545-46.
567 See supra text accompanying note 72.
568 Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1434.
569 See supra note 59.
570 Schneider, supra note 10, at 10.
571 See Raab v. General Physics Corp., 4 F.3d 286, 288-89 (4th Cir. 1993) (explaining
that "[t]he securities laws require [a company] to speak truthfully to investors; they do not
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The eighth method is for courts to limit the circumstances surround-
ing and the time frame within which plaintiffs can bring a claim alleging
a duty to update. For instance, certain future-oriented statements will
over time become "stale and immaterial. '57 2 Since Ross v. A.H. Robins
Co., Inc., the courts have not further refined the "alive" standard, which
prescribed that the duty to update lasts only as long as a reasonable in-
vestor can rely on the original disclosure.5 73 For example, the First Cir-
cuit in Polaroid II raised this issue of how long a company would be
"under a duty of disclosure," but declined to address it.574 Similarly,
"[c]ommentators [still] question[ ] how long a forward-looking statement
will be considered current and how far in the future, if at all, an issuer
must continue to update [it]."575 If, for example, a substantial amount of
time has elapsed or information has already been publicized that casts
doubt on the original disclosure, courts can dismiss duty to update
claims.576
There are other ways of narrowing the ambit of the duty to update.
Following the examples of Hillson Partners and Burlington Coat Fac-
tory, the ninth approach is to decline to impose the duty to update in
certain instances for public policy reasons. 577 Courts can argue that the
imposition of a duty to update in a particular case would discourage other
companies from making forward-looking statements that provide inves-
require the company to police statements made by third parties for inaccuracies, even if the
third party attributes the statement[s to the company]").
572 2 BROMBERG, supra note 118, § 6.11(543).
573 See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
574 Polaroid II, 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc). The Third Circuit in Burling-
ton Coat Factory addressed the concept of a "representation .. .remain[ing] 'alive,"' see
supra text accompanying note 501, but it failed to advance the law beyond Ross in this area.
In Weiner, the Third Circuit reiterated the requirement that "for the statement to have.., a
deleterious effect, it [must] ... remain 'alive' in the market, unmodified." Weiner v. Quaker
Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 321 (3d Cir. 1997). The court decided that Quaker's disclosure in its
annual report, available as of September 23, 1994, "cured" its August 4, 1994 projection of its
"misleading effect." Id. As a result, the court held that "no reasonable finder of fact could
conclude that the projection influenced prudent investors." Id.
575 1994 Safe Harbor Release, supra note 140, at 85,787.
576 See, e.g., Weiner, 129 F.3d at 321 (concluding that disclosure in Quaker's September
23, 1994 annual report "cured" an August 4, 1994 statement of its "misleading effect"); Hill-
son Partners Ltd. Partnership v. Adage, Inc., 42 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining that
"'[tlhe securities laws require disclosure of information that is not otherwise in the public
domain,' not information that has already been publicly-indeed, officially-disclosed by the
company" (citing Sailors v. Northern States Power Co., 4 F.3d 610, 613 (8th Cir. 1993) (quot-
ing Acme Propane, Inc. v. Tenexco, Inc., 844 F.2d 1317, 1323 (7th Cir. 1988)))); Raab, 4 F.3d
at 289 (clarifying that a "'failure to disclose material information may be excused where that
information has been made credibly available to the market by other sources"' (quoting In re
Apple Computer Sec. Litig., 886 F.2d 1109, 1115 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 943
(1990))).
577 See supra Part III.B.4; supra notes 306-09 and accompanying text; supra text accom-
panying notes 505-08.
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tors with valuable information and strengthen the securities markets.
Similarly, courts can warn that the imposition of a duty to update in a
particular case would flood the courts with securities fraud lawsuits.
The tenth method, which is related to the previous approach, is to
maintain that Congress's adoption of a safe habor for forward-looking
statements in the PSLRA indicates its opposition to the duty to update.
The Seventh Circuit in Eisenstadt, for example, suggested that the
PSLRA supported a rejection of the duty to update.578 However, as Part
IV.F explained above, this approach is problematic because the vague
language of the PSLRA does not clearly reject the duty to update.
Courts, of course, could employ any combination of these ap-
proaches to narrow the reach of the duty to update. For now, courts, in
most cases, will follow precedent in their jurisdictions. In one respect,
the various circuits have treated duty to update cases similarly. They
have been reluctant to impose a broad duty to update on companies. This
reluctance suggests that most courts will avail themselves of the afore-
mentioned ten ways to reduce the scope of the duty to update.
CONCLUSION
As a result of intercircuit inconsistency and the SEC's and Con-
gress's failure to provide clarification, the precise contours of the duty to
update remain uncertain. The bewildering case law is in dire need of
clarification and consistency, which will come only from further legisla-
tive action or a Supreme Court decision that directly addresses whether
and when a company has a duty to update a prior disclosure that was
originally accurate, but became materially inaccurate, misleading, or in-
complete due to the passage of time or subsequent events.579 In the in-
terim, companies remain uncertain of their duties with respect to
updating prior disclosures, 580 and will remain reluctant to make forward-
looking statements. Similarly, shareholders and their lawyers are uncer-
tain whether companies have breached a duty to correct, a duty to update,
or whether a duty to update exists at all, and therefore, do not know how
to plead.581
578 See supra note 466 and accompanying text.
579 The Supreme Court has never heard a duty to correct or a duty to update case. See
Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., Inc., 51 F.3d 1329, 1331 n.1 (7th Cir. 1995). The Seventh
Circuit in Stransky noted that "the Court affirmatively declined to discuss the question of
liability for projections in Basic Inc. v. Levinson." Id.
580 See 1994 Safe Harbor Release, supra note 140, at 85,787.
581 See, e.g., In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1430 (3d Cir.
1997) (explaining that "although plaintiffs characterize their claim as a 'duty to correct' claim,
they appear to be asserting both a duty to correct and a duty to update"); Stransky, 51 F.3d at
1331, 1336 (complaining that "[Ilitigants often fail to distinguish between [the duties to correct
and update] (as did Stransky in this case) and to delineate their exact parameters," which the
court deemed somewhat understandable in light "of the confused state of the law in the area").
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A limited duty to update should and does currently exist-except in
the jurisdictions that have declined to recognize the duty. Although its
statutory and case law origins are the same as those of the duty to cor-
rect, the duty to update differs from the duty to correct. A company has a
duty to correct material, initially inaccurate historical statements.5 82 By
contrast, the vast majority of cases and scholarly works have concluded
that the duty to update only applies to material, initially accurate for-
ward-looking statements that have become materially inaccurate or mis-
leading. While the courts have almost universally accepted the duty to
correct, several post-Polaroid H cases have refused to recognize the duty
to update, and most are averse to imposing it on companies. The distinc-
tion between the two duties is significant because the imposition of a
duty to update, when added to the almost universally recognized duty to
correct, could be very burdensome and costly for companies. In addi-
tion, it is likely to discourage companies from making projections, which
would deprive investors and securities professionals of valuable
information.
In light of the circuit split on the duty to update and the legislative
intent underlying the PSLRA, which is to protect investors by encourag-
ing forward-looking statements, courts are likely to limit the scope of the
duty to update. This limiting of the scope of the duty to update would
reflect a preference for achieving the public policy goal of protecting
investors by promoting forward-looking statements rather than via the
imposition on companies of a broad duty to update. Part V identified ten
ways that courts may continue to recognize the duty, yet greatly restrict
its imposition. Many of these foreseeable restrictions on the scope of the
duty to update speak to the "special circumstances" requirement of Po-
laroid II, which the First Circuit neglected to clarify in Polaroid H or
thereafter. 583 The Third Circuit in Burlington Coat Factory recently sug-
gested in dicta that these special circumstances may exist "[w]here the
initial disclosure relates to the announcement of a fundamental change in
the course the company is likely to take. ' 584 Although the Third Circuit
in Weiner did not expressly identify the merger context that surrounded
the statement at issue in the case as constituting the required special cir-
cumstances, its holding that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the
defendant had a duty to update certain statements suggests that the court
found that the necessary special circumstances were present. This spe-
582 Cf Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1431 (suggesting in dicta that the duty to
correct "can also apply to a certain narrow set of forward-looking statements"). For a discus-
sion of how the court in Burlington Coat Factory departed from the prior duty to correct case
law, see supra Part IV.J. .
583 See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text; supra text accompanying notes 388-
90.
584 Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1433-34.
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cial circumstances requirement gives courts wide discretion in determin-
ing when to impose a duty to update. In the absence of further
legislation or binding precedent from the Supreme Court, courts will
likely dismiss many duty to update claims on the ground that the requi-
site special circumstances are lacking.
Jeffrey A. Brillt
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